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ABSTRACT 
Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information- 
sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is 
stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on 
external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This 
effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller 
panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.  
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A growing literature dating back to King and Levine (1993) demonstrates the important 
connections between financial development and growth, a link that has spurred further 
exploration into various aspects of financial development and their influences on the economy.1    
Much of this evidence, however, relies on macro country-level data and aggregate measures of 
financial development (e.g., private credit to GDP ratio) and economic performance (e.g., GDP 
growth). Using a large sample of firm-level survey data on more than 64,000 firms across 102 
countries over the period 2002 to 2010, this paper assesses the relationship between financial 
outreach (i.e., credit information sharing and banks’ branch network penetration) and the 
incidence and extent of tax evasion.  
Compared with existing literature, our study focuses on a specific dimension of financial 
development - financial sector outreach - and an important economic outcome at the micro level 
- firm tax evasion. Moreover, the nature of the database we use allows us to exploit cross-
sectional variation across firms within a country and time-series variation on a subsample of 
firms with panel data available. This helps alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias and reverse 
causation. The study therefore adds to our understanding about how financial systems help 
reduce information asymmetries and increase the opportunity cost of tax evasion.  
Studying tax evasion is important for both academics and policy makers alike. First, the 
degree to which financial market development influences the public policy space, that is, the 
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policy options, has gained increasing importance. 2  The 
ability to collect taxes is an important though often underestimated dimension of fiscal policy. 
According to Schneider and Ernste (2000), tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the 
developing (and even the developed) world, with estimates of tax evasion above 50% in many 
low-income countries.3  More importantly, tax evasion has been viewed as an important factor in 
the current sovereign debt crisis as it creates fiscal instability and deficit. According to a member 
of Greece’s central bank, the extent of tax evasion in the country is about one third of its total tax 
revenue, or about the same size as the country’s budget deficit.4  There is a concern that tax 
evasion may also drive other European countries such as Italy into crisis.5 Identifying policy 
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areas that have a first-order effect on reducing tax evasion is therefore critical for policy makers.  
Second, tax evasion has repercussions for information asymmetries, corporate 
governance, and agency problems among a firm’s stakeholders. As pointed out in the literature 
(e.g., Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Chen et al. (2010)), tax evasion creates opacity and 
obfuscation, which could be used to mask rent diversion activities such as earnings management, 
related party transactions, and other opportunistic behaviors by management. Kim, Li and Zhang 
(2011) find that tax avoidance facilitates rent extraction by management and information 
hoarding activities, and as a consequence increases the risk of stock prices crashing. Therefore, 
understanding how specific policy dimensions in the financial sector can help reduce information 
asymmetries and agency conflicts has been a first-order issue for financial economists.   
Existing literature suggests several channels through which banking sector outreach, that 
is, better information sharing and branch network expansion, might affect the benefits and costs 
of corporate tax evasion. First, higher banking sector outreach increases the opportunity costs of 
tax evasion by raising the likelihood and benefits of gaining access to formal finance. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) find that banking sector outreach helps reduce firms’ 
financing obstacles. Furthermore, as documented in the recent literature, credit information 
sharing is associated with lower transaction costs (Miller (2003)), improved availability and 
lower cost of credit (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009)), lower levels of lending corruption 
(Barth et al. (2009)) and lower levels of bank risk taking (Houston et al. (2010)). In more general 
terms, Johnson et al. (2000) point out that firms are more likely to hide output in economies with 
underdeveloped market-support institutions because they gain little from being formal. Overall, 
this would imply higher benefits from correctly reporting firms’ sales in economies with more 
effective credit information sharing and higher branch penetration by gaining access to the 
formal financial sector.  
Second, more effective information sharing and more extensive branch penetration 
reduce information asymmetries and agency problems between lenders and borrowers and thus 
decrease the benefits of tax evasion. To evade taxes, firms inevitably need to manipulate their 
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financial information (“cook the books”). As documented in the literature, firms suffer 
significant reputation losses and incur much higher financing costs due to illegal misconduct 
such as corporate misreporting (e.g., Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008)). From a bank’s perspective, 
tax evasion signals low quality of disclosed company information and other aspects of the firm's 
operations.6 Tax evasion also raises bank’s concerns about the firm’s future prospects and default 
risk because tax evasion is usually associated with significant legal liabilities.7  As a result, 
information asymmetries and agency problems between borrowers and lenders increase with tax 
evasion, which in turn affects banks’ lending decisions and requires banks to monitor firms more 
intensively (Lin et al. (2011)). The higher costs are passed along to borrowers in the form of 
reduced credit availability, higher interest rates, and more stringent loan terms (Graham, Li, and 
Qiu (2008)). In an economy with higher branch penetration and better credit information sharing, 
information related to corporate misconduct can be more easily observed and shared among all 
other potential lenders, which will make it more difficult and/or more expensive to receive future 
loans (Jappelli and Pagano (2002)).8 Hence, the opportunity costs of engaging in tax evasion 
should be higher in countries with higher branch penetration and better credit information-
sharing mechanisms. 
However, there may be countervailing effects due to lower cost of funding and less 
reliance on collateral in financially more developed economies. First, better developed credit 
registries and higher branch penetration might reduce average borrowing costs and thus make the 
potential increase in financing costs due to tax evasion more affordable to firms.9  Another 
possible countervailing effect may stem from collateral being less important to creditors because 
the information gap between creditors and borrowers is smaller and because creditors can 
monitor firms more effectively in economies with better financial outreach.10 Therefore, from 
this perspective the overall opportunity costs of tax evasion may be either higher or lower in 
more financially developed countries, which leaves the question for our empirical tests. 
Using a unique data set across 102 countries and over 64,000 firms, we examine the 
relationship between branch penetration, credit information sharing, and corporate tax evasion. 
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We find very strong evidence that credit information sharing and branch penetration are 
significantly and negatively associated with the incidence and extent of tax evasion, suggesting 
that the net effect of banking sector outreach on corporate tax evasion tends to be negative and 
significant. This result is robust to controlling for a standard indicator of financial depth and for 
an array of other indicators of the institutional and taxation framework of the country in which 
firms operate. To address potential omitted variable biases, which might bias the empirical 
results, we confirm our findings using an instrumental variable approach, using a subsample with 
sample weights, and using an array of other robustness tests. 
Using the same analytical framework as above, we conjecture that the relative benefits 
and costs of access to formal financial services vary across firms of different sizes as well as 
locations. Smaller firms and firms in smaller cities and towns stand to benefit more from gaining 
access to formal financing than larger firms and firms closer to the economic center of a 
country.11  Similarly, firms that depend more on external finance for technological reasons, such 
as a long gestation period or indivisibility of investment, as well as firms with higher growth 
opportunities benefit more from access to formal finance than others (Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Houston et al. (2010), Bekaert et al. (2007)). We should therefore observe that credit information 
sharing and branch penetration have a stronger relationship with tax evasion for smaller firms, 
firms in smaller towns, and firms that rely more on external finance and have higher growth 
opportunities. Our empirical results strongly confirm these hypotheses. The relationship between 
credit information sharing, branch penetration, and corporate tax evasion is indeed stronger for 
smaller firms, firms located in smaller cities and towns, and firms in industries more dependent 
on external finance and in industries and countries with better growth prospects. Showing the 
differential effects of credit information sharing and branch penetration across firms of different 
characteristics, combined with the instrumental variable approach, helps alleviate concerns 
stemming from endogeneity and omitted variables.   
Finally, exploiting within-firm variation over time, we confirm our results for a more 
limited panel sample of 3,800 firms across 42 countries, many of which introduced credit 
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registries or upgraded them in the early 2000s and have seen changes in branch penetration.  
These firms were interviewed in two survey waves so that we can directly observe whether there 
is a relationship between changes in the quality of credit information sharing, branch penetration, 
and firms’ tax evasion.  We confirm our results both for the level and the differential effect of 
credit information sharing on tax evasion, further alleviating endogeneity concerns. 
Our paper bridges and connects several literatures.  First, we add to the literature on 
finance and growth by exploring the link between specific dimensions of financial sector 
development and the incidence and extent of tax evasion. The empirical findings shed light on an 
important channel through which financial intermediary development can improve economic 
growth and increase the fiscal policy space.12   
Second, this paper is related to the literature on tax avoidance and agency problems 
within the firm. Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) find large 
cross-country variation in private benefits of control, related to – among other things – tax 
compliance. This literature, however, focuses mostly on conflicts between management and 
block shareholders, on the one hand, and minority shareholders, on the other hand, and the 
importance of corporate governance in reducing managerial rent extraction.13 Our paper relates 
to agency problems between lenders and firms, with tax evasion exacerbating this agency 
problem, but less so in countries with better information sharing and higher branch penetration. 
While previous literature uses measures of tax avoidance and shelters based on financial 
statements and/or stock prices (mostly for the U.S.), we focus on a much cruder phenomenon and 
more important challenge in developing countries, namely, underreporting of sales and income 
or tax evasion.14   
Third, this paper is related to a small but growing literature on credit information sharing. 
Building on theoretical work (Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Padilla and Pagano (1997)), Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) find that both creditor protections and information-sharing 
institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP using country-level data in 
129 countries. Moreover, credit information sharing is associated with improved availability and 
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lower cost of credit (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009)), lower levels of lending corruption 
(Barth et al. (2009)), and lower levels of bank risk taking (Houston et al. (2010)). More recently, 
based on a randomized field experiment, Gine, Goldberg, and Yang (2012) explore the 
importance of personal identification for credit market efficiency. Our paper adds to the literature 
by finding evidence that credit information sharing is also an effective device in curbing 
corporate tax evasion.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes data and 
methodology. Section II discusses our results. Section III concludes. 
 
I. Data and methodology 
 To test the relationship between banking sector outreach and the pervasiveness of tax 
evasion, we combine firm-level data from the World Bank-IFC Enterprise Surveys with 
indicators of financial sector depth, breadth, and infrastructure as well as other macroeconomic 
indicators.  This section discusses the different data sources and variables that we use and our 
methodology. In this context, we focus on how to best control for endogeneity and omitted 
variable biases that might drive the relationship between banking sector outreach and tax evasion.  
The Appendix provides definitions and sources for all variables. 
  
A. Data 
We use data from the World Bank-IFC Enterprise Surveys to measure the degree of tax 
evasion and to construct an array of firm-level control variables. The Enterprise Surveys have 
been conducted over the past 10 years in over 100 countries.15 Standardized survey instruments 
and a uniform sampling methodology have been used to minimize measurement error and to 
yield data that are comparable across economies in the world. The surveys try to capture business 
perceptions of the most important obstacles to enterprise operation and growth, but also include 
detailed information on companies’ management and financing arrangements. Sample sizes vary 
between 250 and 1,500 companies per country and data are collected using either simple random 
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or randomly stratified sampling.  The sample includes formal enterprises of all sizes and 
different ownership types across 26 industries in manufacturing, construction, services, and 
transportation.  Firms from different locations, such as the capital city, major cities, and small 
towns, are included.  
The use of firm-level survey data in cross-country work has become increasingly popular 
in recent years and has several decisive advantages over the use of aggregate country-level 
data.16  First, existing papers using the same database show that firms’ responses to the survey 
are closely related to measurable outcomes in terms of corruption, expropriation, property rights 
protection, corporate financing, operation obstacles, tax evasion, investment, performance, and 
growth (e.g., Johnson et al. (2000), Djankov et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008, 2010), Barth et al. (2009)). Second, the data set 
provides unique and direct evidence on firm-level corporate tax evasion for a large sample of 
firms across more than 100 countries around the world.  Third, we are able to explore within-
country variation in tax evasion across firms of different types. Specifically, we are able to 
compare firms of different sizes and in different locations, as well as firms from industries with 
different financing needs. This enables us to apply a difference-in-difference approach to 
alleviate endogeneity concerns and to explore specific mechanisms through which financial 
outreach affects firm tax evasion.  
Given the trade-off between data availability (e.g., availability of sampling weights and 
panel dimension) and the cross-country scope of the sample coverage, we use several samples in 
our analysis. Our first and broadest sample consists of 157 surveys across 102 countries, 
collected over the period 2002 to 2010, with over 64,000 firm observations. This sample consists 
of a broad cross-section of developing, emerging, and even several developed countries. 
However, we have sampling weights for only a subset of these surveys. In robustness tests, we 
therefore use a subsample of 21,500 firm observations with sampling weights in 38 surveys 
across 34 countries during the period 2006 to 2010. This subsample controls for biases that might 
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arise from inconsistent sampling across countries or sampling that is based on any of our 
explanatory variables, including firm size and location. To control for confounding time-variant 
factors related to either global business cycles or changes within countries, we employ country  
year fixed effects in some of our analyses.  We also confirm all our findings with regressions that 
only use data from the latest enterprise survey of each sample country. 
Using these samples, however, only exploits cross-sectional variation, as even for 
countries with several surveys, these are repeated cross-sections rather than panels.  We therefore 
use a panel of 85 surveys across 42 countries that allow us to exploit within-firm variation in tax 
evasion and banking sector outreach. Unlike the larger cross-sectional samples, this is a 
relatively small sample with around 3,800 firms. Surveys were undertaken between 2002 and 
2010 and the sample includes countries from Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & the 
Caribbean, the Middle East & North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. This panel allows us to 
exploit within-firm variation over time and thus control for omitted time-invariant firm-level 
factors that might drive our findings in the cross-sectional regressions. This panel also allows us 
to control for time-invariant firm-level measurement bias.     
We construct the tax evasion variable using responses from the following question:  
“Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and 
regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your 
area of activity reports for tax purposes?”  Using responses to this question, we construct two 
variables: Tax Evasion Ratio, which is one minus the share of sales reported for tax purposes, 
and Tax Evasion Dummy, which is one if a company’s tax evasion ratio is a nonzero positive 
number. While the latter variable gauges the incidence of tax evasion, the former gauges the 
extent.  The tax evasion ratio ranges from an average of 68% in Gambia to less than 4% in 
Ireland, with an average across countries of 21%. While in Brazil 83% of firms report tax 
evasion in their industry, in Spain this figure is only 18.5% and the average across countries is 
45%. Table I reports the average values for these two indicators across the countries in our 
sample. The variation in tax evasion is large both across and within countries, with a cross-
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country standard deviation of 0.150 and a within-country standard deviation of 0.278.17 The high 
within-country variation suggests that it is important to focus on the firm-level rather than the 
country-level and that there is important cross-firm and cross-industry variation to be exploited 
when gauging the relationship between financial sector indicators and firm-level tax evasion. 
Similarly, the variation in tax evasion is large both across and within country-industry cells. The 
cross-country-industry standard deviation is 0.158 and the within-country-industry standard 
deviation is 0.272. While many of the country-level numbers reported in Table I match anecdotal 
evidence, there are also surprising findings, such as Germany, where 45% of firms state that they 
evade taxes although the tax evasion ratio is rather low at 5.7%.   
[Table I here] 
The question on tax evasion is worded in this indirect way to elicit more honest answers. 
Nevertheless, this wording might provide some measurement error as responses might reflect 
perceived industry averages rather than own behavior.  There are several reasons to believe that 
this does not bias our results. First, as Johnson et al. (2000) point out, “managers presumably 
most often respond based on their own experiences, and with caution we believe the responses 
can be interpreted as indicating the firms’ own payments.” In fact, the large within-country-
industry variation also alleviates the concern that the firm responds to the question based on 
industry average rather than own behavior. Second, tax evasion ratios are relatively stable over 
time within a country.  The correlation between tax evasion ratios from the Enterprise Surveys 
over 2002 to 2010 and from the World Business Environment surveys in 1999/2000 is 64%. 
Third, there is a high correlation between the ratio of informal activity to GDP and tax evasion. 
Specifically, using data from Schneider and Ernste (2000) we find a correlation coefficient of 
65%, significant at the 1% level. We also find a high correlation (>60%) between our tax evasion 
measure and the tax evasion index developed by the World Competitiveness Yearbook.18 
We recognize that the measurement bias can go both directions, especially when the 
interviewer is from the public sector or any financial institution with which the entrepreneur 
might have a (potential) relationship. Fortunately, the World Bank is well aware of the potential 
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biases and hence organizes the interviews in a particular way to avoid these biases. For instance, 
given the sensitive nature of the data, government officials are not directly involved in data 
collection of these surveys nor are they given any raw data or any information that allows them 
to identify the responses of individual firms. Critically, financial institutions are not involved in 
the collection of such data – respondents are therefore unlikely to base their response on their 
(potential) relationship with a financial institution. Rather, the surveys are conducted by the 
World Bank in partnership with the local private sector such as independent chambers of 
commerce or business associations that the local firms have confidence in.  Further, questions on 
the relationship between private and public sectors are at the end of the questionnaire once the 
enumerator has established trust and confidence of the surveyed. In addition, the use of within-
firm variation over time reduces these biases, as we discuss below.  A somewhat different 
measurement concern is that we measure tax evasion only for existing formal enterprises, not 
capturing informal enterprises; however, this will underestimates the variation in tax evasion 
across countries (Johnson et al. (2000)).   
We relate our measures of tax evasion to an array of financial sector indicators. We start 
with a standard indicator of financial depth, Private Credit to GDP , which measures total 
outstanding claims of financial institutions on the domestic nonfinancial private sector relative to 
GDP (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005)).  Previous research finds a positive and 
significant relationship between financial sector depth and economic growth (Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza (2000)).  While Private Credit to GDP  has been traditionally used as an indicator of 
financial development, it does not properly measure the breadth of the financial system, that is, 
the extent to which financial institutions cater to smaller and geographically more remote 
customers. We therefore use a recently compiled data set on banking sector outreach – the 
Financial Access Survey from the IMF. Specifically, we use Demographic Branch Penetration, 
which is defined as the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 adults. We have data available 
since 2003/4 and match the year of the firm-level survey to the year of branching data, with the 
exception of firm-level surveys in 2002 for which we use 2003/4 branch penetration data.19 
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While branch penetration is positively correlated with Private Credit to GDP , this correlation is 
far from perfect.  For example, both Bulgaria and Egypt have Private Credit to GDP  ratios 
around 47%, but Demographic Branch Penetration is 7.5 per 1,000,000 adults in Bulgaria while 
it is 0.42 in Egypt. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) show that higher branch 
penetration is associated with a higher share of households and firms that use formal financial 
services and with lower self-reported financing constraints of firms. 20  
In addition to branch penetration, we use several indicators of the information framework 
supporting the banking sector, as previous research shows the relevance of credit information 
sharing especially for smaller firms (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009)).  Our principal 
indicator is Depth of Credit Information Sharing, which ranges from zero to six and indicates 
how much information on what share of the borrower population is collected and distributed, as 
well as whether both financial and nonfinancial institutions are tapped for information. 
Specifically, a value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have 
each of these characteristics: (1) both positive and negative credit information are distributed; (2) 
data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade 
creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than two 
years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of 
income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data.21 We use 
the value of this variable for the same year as the respective firm-level survey. In the case of 
firm-level surveys in 2002, we use the 2003 value, as this is the earliest year for which 
information on credit information sharing was collected by the Doing Business team at the 
World Bank. 
We control for an array of firm characteristics that might be correlated with the decision 
to underreport sales and that are defined in more detail in the Appendix.  Specifically, we include 
the size of the enterprise, as measured by the log of the number of employees, the log of firm 
age, the location (capital city or small city/town, with medium-sized city as the omitted 
category), a dummy variable if the firm is an exporter, and the share of foreign ownership. 
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Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s financial statements are 
reviewed by an external auditor.  From theory and previous research, we expect size, age, 
exporter, and foreign ownership to be negatively associated with tax evasion, while we expect 
firms located in smaller towns to be more likely to evade taxes.22 As indicated in Table II, 48% 
of the firms in our sample are small firms (fewer than 20 employees), while 21% are large firms 
(more than 100 employees), with an average of 28 employees. On average, firms are 14 years old 
and the average share of foreign ownership is 10%. Further, 20% of firms are exporting, 28% of 
firms are in small cities and towns while 34% are in the capital city. Finally, 49% of the firms in 
our sample have their financial statements audited.  
We also include an array of country-level control variables. In addition to controlling for 
financial depth, we include the indicator Bank Concentration, which is the Herfindahl index 
using data from Bankscope. An extensive literature explores the relationship between market 
structure and access to finance;23 market structure, however, might also impact the degree of 
credit information sharing among banks and their incentives for branch expansion. Controlling 
for Private Credit to GDP and Bank Concentration increases our confidence that the measures of 
branch penetration and credit information sharing do not capture other dimensions of financial 
development. In addition, we control for GDP per capita, to discriminate between economic and 
financial development. Our sample varies between Ethiopia with 123 U.S. dollars GDP per 
capita and Ireland with a GDP per capita of more than 48,000 U.S. dollars (at the time of the 
survey). As with all time-varying country-level variables, we use the value for the same year as 
the respective firm-level survey. 
We also include several proxies for alternative explanations of tax evasion.  First, we 
include Tax Rate, which is measured as the total tax payments and contributions of a typical 
commercial enterprise relative to its profits (Djankov et al. (2010)). On the one hand, a higher 
tax rate increases the benefits of evasion. On the other hand, a higher tax burden can also lead to 
better public good provision by the government, which increases the opportunity costs of tax 
evasion. We include an indicator that captures the time it takes to prepare, file, and pay corporate 
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income tax, value added or sales tax, and labor taxes, including payroll taxes and social 
contributions. We also include an indicator for the number of tax payments a typical company 
has to make per year and the ease with which they can be done. These two indicators proxy for 
the tax administration burden firms face and should be positively associated with tax evasion.  
We also include a dummy for countries that have a VAT system in place. A VAT system allows 
enterprises to offset tax payment on inputs against tax payments on sales and should thus reduce 
benefits from tax evasion. A VAT system is in place for 89% of countries.24  Second, as pointed 
out in the literature (e.g., Friedman et al. (2000), Johnson et al. (2000)), tax evasion might be 
driven by bureaucracy, predatory behavior by government officials such as bribery seeking, 
weak legal institutions, and deficient public services. Therefore, in our baseline regressions, we 
include the country-level indicators Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, and Government 
Effectiveness, all from the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) Governance Matters database 
and its updates. We also control for the country-level crime rate as firms might hide some of 
their profits to escape extortion by criminal gangs (Johnson et al. (2000)). Detailed definitions of 
these variables can be found in the Appendix.  
Table II presents descriptive statistics of all variables, while in the Internet Appendix we 
report the correlations between the different variables.25  The correlations indicate that firms 
located in smaller towns, smaller firms, and younger firms evade a higher share of taxes, while 
foreign-owned firms and exporting firms evade taxes to a lesser degree. However, there are also 
many significant correlations between firm characteristics. Smaller firms are more likely to be 
located in smaller towns and are less likely to be an exporter, and are younger.  The country-
level correlations show that tax evasion by firms is more prominent in countries with lower 
branch penetration and less efficient credit information sharing.  However, tax evasion is also 
significantly associated with corruption, taxation, government effectiveness, and economic and 





To assess the relationship between tax evasion and banking sector outreach, we run the 
following regression:                                   ,              (1) 
where T is the tax evasion ratio or dummy as reported by firm j in country i and industry k, F  is a 
vector of financial sector indicators, including indicators of credit information sharing and 
branch penetration, C is an array of country-level control variables, B is a vector of firm-level 
control variables, as discussed above,  is a vector of 26 industry dummies, and is the error 
term. We also include year dummies for the year in which the survey was conducted to control 
for any global trends and for differences within countries with several surveys. We use a Tobit 
model for the regression of tax evasion ratio, as this variable is bounded between zero and one, 
and a Probit model for the regressions of tax evasion dummy.  We report marginal effects rather 
than coefficient estimates to gauge the statistical as well as economic significance of our 
regression results. Further, in the spirit of Petersen (2009), we report p-values based on clustered 
standard errors, that is, allowing for correlation between error terms within-country, but not 
across countries. A negative and significant would indicate that deeper financial systems, 
higher branch penetration, and a more effective and inclusive information framework are 
associated with a lower incidence of tax evasion and a lower tax evasion ratio. As these 
estimations are subject to endogeneity and omitted variable biases, we also present instrumental 
variables (IV) and firm fixed effects regressions, discussed in more depth below.  
 The variation across firms of different sizes, locations, and sectors allows us to test for a 
differential impact of financial sector development on tax evasion. Specifically, the hypotheses 
formulated above predict the impact of financial sector development to be stronger for smaller 
firms and for firms in more remote locations. 26  We test for such differential impact by 
augmenting equation (1) with interaction terms in the following regression models:                                                       ,
                 
(2) 
and                                                                ,           (3) 
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where Size is a vector of dummies for small and large firms (with medium-sized firms being the 
benchmark category) and Location is a vector of dummies for firms in the capital city and small 
cities (with firms in medium-sized cities being the benchmark category). A small city is defined 
as having less than 250,000 inhabitants. The linear term of Size and Location are also included in 
the model. Theory would suggest a negative coefficient on the interaction of financial sector 
depth and outreach with Small Firm and Small City, while we expect positive coefficients on the 
interaction of financial sector depth and outreach with Large Firm and Capital City.  
Beyond size and location influencing firms’ benefits from formality in countries with 
more effective credit information sharing and higher branch penetration, there might also be 
industry variation and time-variant country-level variation in these benefits.  A large literature 
exploits industry variation in characteristics such as dependence on external financing and 
growth opportunities as identification conditions to assess the impact of financial and 
institutional development on firm growth.  Such an identification strategy relies on the 
assumption that such industry features are constant across countries and uses actual data on 
external financing and growth from industries in the U.S. as benchmarks under the assumption 
that they reflect demand-side factors.27 Unlike firm characteristics that might be endogeneous to 
the perceived benefits of tax evasion, these industry characteristics are exogenous.  We focus on 
two industry characteristics constructed based on these assumptions from existing literature.  
First, Dependence on External Finance is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with 
internal funds (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). We use data from the Capital IQ database, which 
contains a large number of both public and private firms in the U.S., to construct this indicator.  
Second, we use two measures of growth opportunities. The first measure follows Fisman and 
Love (2007) and takes U.S. industrial value-added growth over the period 1990 to 1999 as gauge 
for growth opportunities outside the U.S. over our 2002 to 2010 sample period. A second 
measure of growth opportunities is at the country level. Following Bekaert et al. (2007), we 
compute the exogenous growth opportunities of country i in year t as the PE ratios computed on 
global data on listed companies, averaged across 35 sectors weighed by annual country-specific 
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industry weights based on lagged market capitalization. As this measure might be driven by 
differences in persistent discount rates, we follow Bekaert et al. (2007) and remove a 60-month 
moving average from this measure. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in the 
Appendix. 
To test for a differential impact of banking sector outreach on firms in different 
industries, we use the following specification:                                                    ,              (4) 
where Industry is an industry characteristic, either dependence on external finance or growth 
opportunities.28  Since we control for industry dummies and include the levels of the respective 
financial sector indicators, the coefficients capture the differential effect of credit information 
sharing and branch penetration on firms in industries with different financing needs and growth 
opportunities.  
 While we report Tobit regressions to assess the differential impact of size, location, and 
industry characteristics on the relationship between branch penetration, credit information 
sharing, and tax evasion, we confirm all our findings with OLS regressions given the difficulty 
of interpreting the marginal effects of interaction terms in nonlinear models (Ai and Norton 
(2003)). We also present IV regressions for models (2) to (4) where we instrument for credit 
information sharing, branch penetration, and their interaction with firm, industry, and country 
characteristics. 
 In a final set of regressions, we use a smaller panel sample of firms and countries to test 
the relationship between credit information sharing, branch penetration, and tax evasion over 
time:                                                                ,
             
(5) 
where Xj  are firm fixed effects and t is the year of the survey. Year dummies are also included.   
Here, we only include the time-varying firm variables among the vector B of firm-level 
characteristics. We focus on regressions where we interact credit information sharing and branch 
penetration with Firm, which is an array of firm size dummies, firm location dummies or 
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industry characteristics. Unlike the preceding regressions, we use OLS to estimate specification 
(5), given that Tobit panel data models with fixed effects yield biased estimates (see Greene 
(2004)).29  We also run IV regressions, where we instrument for credit information sharing, 
branch penetration, and their interaction with firm and industry characteristics.  
 
II. Empirical Results 
Combining firm-, industry- and country-level variations, this section tests whether better 
credit information sharing and higher branch penetration are associated with lower tax evasion.  
We first explore the effect of cross-country variation in credit information sharing and branch 
penetration, before combining it with firm- and industry-level variations.  We also use 
instrumental variable analysis and firm-level fixed effects regressions for a sub-sample to control 
more rigorously for simultaneity and endogeneity biases and gauge the robustness of our 
findings for several subsamples. Throughout the discussion, we report both statistical and 
economic significance of our results. 
 
A. Baseline Results 
The results in Table III show a statistically and economically significant relationship 
between the depth of credit information / branch penetration and the incidence and extent of tax 
evasion across a sample of 157 surveys and 102 countries.  We report both Probit (Panel A) and 
Tobit regressions (Panel B) that include unreported industry and year dummies and the standard 
errors of the coefficients clustered at the country level. We present three Probit and three Tobit 
regressions, where we start with a simple model with only the two indicators of depth of credit 
information and branch penetration, GDP per capita, and firm-level control variables. We then 
add country-level variables related to taxation before finally adding other country-level variables 
that might explain cross-country variation in the incidence and extent of tax evasion.  
[Table III here] 
As can be seen from Table III, the depth of credit information and branch penetration are 
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associated with a lower incidence and extent of tax evasion. Both Depth of Credit Information 
Sharing and Demographic Branch Penetration enter negatively and significantly in the Probit 
and Tobit regressions. The effect is also economically significant. The results in columns (1) and 
(4) suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in Depth of Credit Information Sharing is 
associated with a 16.6% drop in the likelihood of corporate tax evasion and a 12.6% drop in the 
tax evasion ratio, while a one-standard-deviation increase in Demographic Branch Penetration is 
associated with a 12.3% reduction in the incidence of tax evasion and a 9% reduction of the tax 
evasion ratio.30  Given the sample mean of the incidence of tax evasion (46.3%) and the extent of 
tax evasion (21.3%), these effects are quite substantial. We also note that neither statistical nor 
economic significance is affected as we include country-level control variables.   
Turning to the control variables, we find that GDP per capita enters consistently with a 
negative sign, though not always significantly, suggesting that higher levels of economic 
development are associated with a lower incidence and extent of tax evasion. Several of the firm-
level variables enter significantly in the regressions, including firm size, location, ownership, and 
the dummy indicating whether firms’ financial statements are audited. We also find that several 
dimensions of the tax system are significantly and positively associated with tax evasion, 
including the total tax rate, the time to prepare and pay taxes, and the total number of taxes. On 
the other hand, firms in countries with a VAT system report lower tax evasion, though this 
relationship is not always significant. Concerning alternative country-level explanations of tax 
evasion, we find that deeper financial sector depth, as proxied by Private Credit to GDP , is 
associated with a lower incidence and extent of tax evasion. A higher bank concentration is 
positively and significantly associated with the extent but not the incidence of tax evasion. Better 
rule of law, tighter control of corruption, more effective government, and lower crime all reduce 
tax evasion, though not always significantly. 
 
B. Instrumental Variable Analysis and Sample Weights 
Endogeneity is often a concern in cross-country studies. In our study, it is conceivable 
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that a high degree of tax evasion could generate calls for a higher degree of information sharing 
and branch expansion. If this kind of feedback from the corporate sector to policymaking were in 
force, we should observe a positive relation between depth of credit information / branch 
penetration and tax evasion. However, we find a strong and negative relation between 
information sharing / branch penetration and tax evasion, confirming that reverse causality might 
not be a first-order concern in this study. Nevertheless, since our baseline regressions link 
country variation in banking sector outreach to firm-level tax evasion, omitted variable bias 
could still be of concern. We address this concern with instrumental variable regressions and 
report both first- and second-stage results, both for the larger sample as well as for the sample 
with sampling weights. 
To address the concern of possible reverse causality between financial outreach and tax 
evasion, we conduct a thorough search of related documents, reports, announcements, papers, 
and books about the potential driving factors of the establishment of credit registries and the 
expansion of branch networks. We do not find any quotes about tax evasion as a reason for these 
activities. Instead, we find the major reasons for setting up credit registries and the expansion of 
branch networks are to improve the credit assessment and risk management of financial 
institutions, strengthen bank supervision and regulation, lower the cost of information collection, 
enhance financial stability, and facilitate access to credit markets.  Therefore, in this study we 
use measures of the banking regulatory and supervisory structure as instrumental variables for 
depth of credit information sharing and branch penetration. The data are obtained from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database compiled by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006, 2008). 
Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in the Appendix.  Intuitively, bank regulation 
and supervision should have a direct impact on banks’ risk management incentives and outreach 
decisions but not affect corporate tax avoidance directly. To reduce the risk that these regulatory 
and supervisory structures are due to policy reforms taken at the same time as changes in credit 
information sharing systems, we focus on variables that are persistent or that do not directly 
reflect policy actions.    
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We use several variables gauging the structure, strength, and independence of 
supervisory authorities. Specifically, we include the average tenure of bank supervisors as a 
proxy both for experience and independence, the log of the number of bank supervisors, an index 
of supervisory independence from both banks and politicians, and an index of supervisory power 
vis-a-vis banks in good and bad times.  More experienced and independent bank supervisors are 
more likely to adopt state-of-the-art bank regulations that help improve banking system stability 
(Houston, Lin and Ma (2012)). This might also be the case for countries with more complicated 
regulatory systems (e.g., the presence of multiple bank regulators). More powerful supervisors 
are more capable to push for reforms and adopt new regulatory frameworks. We also use the 
historical nonperforming loan ratio (i.e., the previous five-year average ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total loans) as an additional instrumental variable. A high nonperforming loan ratio 
might increase banks’ and the regulator’s incentives to adopt regulation and mechanisms that 
enhance banks’ risk management and credit assessment practices (e.g., credit registries). 
Furthermore, following Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), we also use an indicator of 
“policy contagion” by including the share of countries in each region with a credit registry. As 
regulators or policymakers learn more about the workings of a regulation from those countries 
implementing the regulation, they might modify their regulations after observing regulatory 
changes in other countries in the same field. In addition, we include the share of foreign and 
private bank ownership as additional instrumental variables. Unlike state-owned banks, privately 
owned (especially foreign) banks are typically more efficient in their outreach, have stronger 
incentives to manage credit risk, and rely more on hard information and thus credit registries.   
The first-stage results presented in the Internet Appendix show significant relationships 
between the instrumental variables (IV) and our indicators of credit information sharing and 
branch penetration. The findings are largely consistent with our expectations. Specifically, we 
find that countries with supervisors that have longer tenure and enjoy more independence and 
power, higher ratios of nonperforming loans, more private and foreign bank ownership, and a 
larger share of countries in the same region with credit registries have higher Depth of Credit 
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Information Sharing. Countries with supervisors with longer tenure and higher independence, a 
larger private and foreign bank market share, and a bigger share of neighboring countries in the 
region with credit registries have higher Demographic Branch Penetration. While not all 
variables enter significantly in all four first-stage regressions, they enter jointly significantly at 
the 1% level in all eight regressions, with F-values well above 10, a threshold often used to assess 
the relevance of instruments (Staiger and Stock (1997)).  In robustness tests, we include other 
variables related to supervisory structure and banks’ accounting transparency and obtain similar 
results for both first- and second-stage regressions. 
The second-stage regression results reported in Table IV Panel A show the robustness of 
our findings to controlling for endogeneity and simultaneity biases. Henceforth, we report only 
Tobit regressions with the tax evasion ratio, though our results are confirmed when using Probit 
regressions with the incidence of tax evasion. We find very strong and consistent evidence that 
more effective credit information sharing and higher branch penetration are associated with 
lower degrees of tax evasion. The IV coefficients are also of similar size as the OLS coefficients. 
We also conduct the Hansen overidentifying J-test to assess whether the instrumental variables are 
associated with the tax evasion ratio beyond their effects through depth of credit information, 
branch penetration, or other explanatory variables. The Hansen’s J-test suggests that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid in all model specifications.31  
[Table IV here] 
 The results in Table IV Panel B show that our results are robust to controlling for sampling 
weights using a smaller sample of countries for which such weights are available, while at the 
same time using instrumental variables.32 The sampling weight is the inverse of the probability 
of selection of the firms surveyed. The interpretation of the sampling weight is that it 
characterizes the number of firms in the population that are represented by this particular sample 
firm. Only Enterprise Surveys from 2005/6 onwards include sampling weights, in total, 38 
surveys for 34 countries with 21,541 observations available in our IV regressions.  The empirical 
results presented in Panel B of Table IV show that our main findings are confirmed, with the 
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coefficients on our main variables of interest entering with similar statistical and economic 
significance as in Panel A of Table IV.  The first-stage results in the Internet Appendix again 
confirm the relevance of our instruments.   
We use an additional test to control for possible differences in sampling methodologies 
across regions. Specifically, we test the robustness of our results by dropping one region at a 
time - 1) East Asia & the Pacific, 2) Europe & Central Asia, 3) Latin America & the Caribbean, 
4) the Middle East & North Africa, 5) South Asia, and 6) Sub-Saharan Africa – from the 
regressions in Table III. The empirical results are highly robust. 
While the IV regressions control for endogeneity and omitted variable biases, we test 
directly for reverse causation by relating changes in credit information sharing and branch 
expansion between the two surveys to the average level of tax evasion in each country, reported 
in the Internet Appendix.  Tax evasion enters insignificantly in all regressions, suggesting that 
policy changes to credit registries and bureaus and branch expansion by banks are not related to 
the ex-ante tax evasion environment. In addition, we estimate the correlation between changes in 
credit information and changes in general institutional environment measures (e.g., government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, quality of regulation, rule of law, property right index) and 
find very low correlations (all the correlation coefficients are below 0.1 and are not statistically 
significant). This helps alleviate the concern that changes in information sharing may be part of a 
larger institutional reform. 
In summary, our results are robust to the use of instrumental variables and sampling 
weights and there is no evidence of reverse causation or simultaneity bias.  Nevertheless, we 
regard the IV regressions as one of several different techniques to control for endogeneity and 
omitted variable bias and present other tests below.  
 
C. Further Robustness Tests 
The Internet Appendix reports an array of robustness tests with different sample cuts and 
additional control variables. First, we drop 21 countries from our sample that either have Islamic 
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banks (as defined in Bankscope) or have adopted Islamic law, as defined by the CIA Factbook.33 
Unlike conventional banking, Islamic banking relies more on risk-sharing arrangements and 
close relationships between the lender and borrower and thus less on formal credit information-
sharing arrangements.  Our findings are confirmed for this subsample of countries.  Second, we 
control for the proportion of informal financing in total financing of working capital and 
investment finance. In countries with underdeveloped financial systems, informal financing 
sources substitute for formal bank credit, increasing the likelihood that the relationship between 
tax evasion and financial sector outreach is spurious.  Our main findings are not affected.  
Third, the literature points out that tax evasion might also be caused by the interplay 
between the state and organized crime (e.g., the mafia) in the provision of public goods (e.g., 
Grossman (1995), Alexeev, Janeba and Osborne (2004)). In countries with inefficient 
governments, the mafia might partially substitute for the provision of public goods. As a 
consequence, firms have incentives to evade taxes, instead paying these resources to the mafia 
for the provision of public goods (e.g., contract enforcement). If the above effect is more 
prevalent in those countries with a lower degree of branch penetration and depth of credit 
information, the relationship between tax evasion and depth of credit information / branch 
penetration might be a spurious one. Therefore, we limit our sample to firms that do not pay for 
mafia protection and whose tax evasion is not driven by the channels we discussed above.34 We 
restrict our sample to countries with above-median rule of law, as firms in these countries are 
less likely to rely on the mafia for provision of public goods. We also confine our sample to 
countries with high government effectiveness as firms are less likely to rely on the mafia for 
public good provision in these countries. In all three cases, we confirm our findings with similar 
statistical and economic significance.  
Fourth, we test for countervailing effects by gauging whether our results hold for two 
subgroups of firms. In general, the more wealth a firm hides in tax evasion, the less collateral it 
can offer for securing a loan and the lower is the likelihood of getting access to credit with 
reasonable terms and conditions. However, in the case of private firms, the share of profits 
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hidden from the tax authorities remains with the business owner, increasing the value of cash 
collateral the owner can provide to banks to secure future loans. Tax evasion in the case of public 
companies, on the other hand, does not accrue to owners, but rather to management, increasing 
agency problems within firms. Therefore, we limit our sample to publicly traded firms and find 
that the results remain significant both statistically and economically.  Moreover, as documented 
in some recent reports (e.g., Gravelle (2010)), large multinational firms and wealthy business 
owners might have various ways to avoid taxes such as shifting profits into low-tax foreign 
subsidiaries, shifting debt to high-tax jurisdictions, and setting up secret bank accounts in tax 
haven countries. To ensure that our results are not driven by these alternative tax evasion 
channels, we focus on domestic small firms (e.g., firms with less than 20 employees and with no 
foreign subsidiaries), which are less likely to engage in sophisticated international tax avoidance 
activities. We continue to find that our main findings on financial outreach and tax evasion are 
statistically and economically significant.  
 Fifth, we address the concern that changes in credit information sharing and branch 
networks might occur simultaneously with other economic policy reforms in the financial 
system, legal environment, and monitoring mechanisms to reduce tax evasion, often fostered by 
comprehensive reform packages with IMF or World Bank support. We therefore drop any 
country that received IMF financial aid or a World Bank funded project in the areas of the 
financial sector, fiscal policy, public administration, or legal system one year prior to and also 
during the survey years. In the case of several surveys in a country, we also require that there 
was no IMF or World Bank assistance between the survey years.  We further control for a capital 
account liberalization index and for an equity market liberalization index to alleviate the concern 
that changes in tax evasion are driven by other types of capital market reforms. In both cases, the 
results are consistent with our expectation.  Finally, using the panel data set on top marginal tax 
rates compiled by the Fraser Institute, we confirm our findings for a subsample of 61 countries 
without changes in tax rates one year prior to, and also during, the survey years. Overall, these 
tests further strengthen our main findings and mitigate the concern that the empirical findings are 
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driven by other capital market or tax reforms.  
Further regressions in the Internet Appendix confirm the robustness of our findings to 
using alternative measures of the information-sharing framework and to controlling for an array 
of additional institutional indicators. Specifically, dummy variables for the existence and 
coverage ratios of both private and public credit registries are associated with lower tax evasion 
ratios, with the economic size of the effects being similar.  Our findings are also robust to 
controlling for other dimensions of a country’s institutional framework, including summary 
indicators of voice and accountability, political stability, and regulatory quality, as well as the 
number of registration steps for new businesses, creditor rights, a property right index, and an 
index of the risk of expropriation by the government.35 While many of these indicators enter 
significantly and with the expected signs, depth of information sharing and geographic branch 
penetration (an alternative measure of banking penetration defined as the number of bank 
branches per 10,000 sq km) continue to enter negatively and significantly in all regressions.   
The Internet Appendix provides an additional robustness test related to possible 
measurement error within country-industry cells. The data on tax evasion are based on a survey 
question related to industry practices. While this question is expected to capture the actual 
behavior of the surveyed firm, there might be cross-firm variation on whether a respondent refers 
to own or competitors’ behavior. To control for this concern, we re-run our main regressions at 
the industry level, averaging firm-level variables within each survey-industry cell. This provides 
us with 1,490 observations across 102 countries and 26 industries, with on average 43 firms per 
cell. The analysis replicates the Table III Tobit regressions for the industry-level sample and 
confirms our main findings.  
We undertake several additional robustness tests. First, we limit the sample to 33 
countries with at least two surveys and changes in the country-level variables, thus focusing on 
the within-country variation in the relationship between tax evasion and financial sector 
outreach. Including country fixed effects allows us to control for other time-invariant country-
level omitted variables. Second, we test whether our results are driven by one specific country 
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and replicate the Table III results omitting each country, one at a time. Since the relationship 
between credit information sharing, branch penetration, and tax evasion might vary with income 
level, we also drop all 15 high-income countries36 from our sample to re-run our regressions.  
Finally, we limit our sample to the latest survey for each country, which reduces our sample to 
18,500 firms, confirming our results.  
Up to now we have related firm-level responses to country-level variation in credit 
information sharing and branch penetration. However, different firms might react differently to 
the incentives and opportunities provided by better credit information sharing and banking sector 
outreach.  We explore this possibility in the following; testing for such differential impact also 
allows us to more rigorously address the issue of omitted variables and causality.   
 
D. Exploiting Firm Location Heterogeneity 
The hypotheses formulated in the introduction suggest a differential relationship of 
information sharing and branch penetration with firms’ decision to evade taxation across firms in 
different locations.  Specifically, firms in more remote areas are conjectured to respond more 
strongly to incentives and opportunities provided by more effective information sharing and 
branch penetration than firms in capital cities.  We examine the firm location conjecture and 
present the empirical results in Table V. 
[Table V here] 
The results in Table V confirm our conjecture and show a significant impact of firm 
location on the relationship between information sharing, branch penetration, and firms’ decision 
to evade taxes. Here we add interaction terms of Depth of Credit Information Sharing and 
Demographic Branch Penetration with dummy variables that indicate whether a firm is located 
in the capital city or a small town, using firms in mid-sized towns as the omitted category.  While 
we find a more muted relationship between information sharing, branch penetration, and tax 
evasion for firms in the capital city, the relationship is even stronger for firms in small towns.  
The differences in the relationship across firms of different locations are also economically 
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significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in Depth of Credit Information Sharing decreases 
tax evasion by 8.1% for firms in the capital city, but by about 18.3% for firms in small towns 
(column (1)).  Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in Demographic Branch Penetration 
decreases tax evasion by 7.9% for firms in the capital city, but by about 15.5% for firms in small 
towns (column (2)).  We also control for the interaction of Private Credit to GDP  with the 
location dummies.  Compared to the location interaction terms with credit information depth and 
branch penetration, however, the interaction of firm location with financial depth is small in size, 
suggesting only a small differential impact of financial depth on firms in different locations.  
The Table V regressions also show that our findings are robust to using IV regressions 
and country fixed effects. In columns (3) and (4), we instrument for credit information depth and 
branch penetration and their interaction with the small and capital city dummies with the same 
variables as in Table IV and confirm our findings. In columns (5) and (6), we drop all country-
level variables, including our financial sector indicators, and replace them with country-year 
dummies. This allows us to control even more rigorously for confounding country factors.  The 
empirical results are highly robust. The interaction terms of firm location with branch penetration 
and credit information depth enter significantly. We confirm our findings while controlling for 
the interactions of Private Credit to GDP  with firm location dummies. 
 
E. Exploiting Firm Size Heterogeneity 
Similarly, we also expect a differential relationship of credit information depth and 
branch penetration with firms’ decision to evade taxation across firms of different sizes.  
Presumably, smaller firms tend to respond more strongly to incentives and opportunities 
provided by more effective information sharing and more expansive branch networks than bigger 
firms.  We test this hypothesis in Table VI. 
[Table VI here] 
The results in Table VI show a significant impact of firm size on the relationship between 
depth of credit information, branch penetration, and tax evasion.  A one-standard-deviation 
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increase in Depth of Credit Information Sharing decreases tax evasion by 6.6% for large firms, 
but by about 16.9% for small firms (column (1)).  Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
Demographic Branch Penetration lowers tax evasion by 9.1% for large firms, but by about 
14.2% for small firms (column (2)). The results in Table VI also reveal that our findings are 
robust to (i) using IV regressions (columns (3) and (4)) and (ii) controlling for country-year fixed 
effects (columns (5) and (6)). We also control for the interactions of Private Credit to GDP  with 
firm size dummies and find that our key results in Table VI are highly robust.  
 
F. Exploiting Industry Heterogeneity 
As discussed above, we expect a stronger link between depth of credit information 
/branch penetration and tax evasion for firms in industries more dependent on external finance 
and with better growth prospects. We also expect a stronger relationship between financial sector 
outreach and tax evasion in countries with exogenously higher growth opportunities.  The results 
in Table VII indeed show significant industry heterogeneity in the relationship of credit 
information depth, branch penetration, and tax evasion. Here, we interact an industry 
characteristic (external finance dependence or growth opportunities) with our financial sector 
indicators. The regression in column (1) suggests that the effect of Demographic Branch 
Penetration and of Depth of Credit Information Sharing on reducing tax evasion increases in 
firms’ dependence on external finance. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in Depth 
of Credit Information decreases tax evasion for firms in the most financially dependent industry 
by 16.1% more than for firms in the least financially dependent industry. A one-standard-
deviation increase in Demographic Branch Penetration decreases tax evasion for firms in the 
most financially dependent industry by 16.5% more than for firms in the least financially 
dependent industry (column (1)).  Similarly, the column (2) and (3) regressions show that the 
relationship of credit information depth, branch penetration, and tax evasion becomes much 
stronger in sectors (GO1) and countries (GO2) with higher growth opportunities. Taken together, 
the results suggest that financial sector outreach increases incentives for firms that are more 
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dependent on external finance and have higher growth opportunities to reduce tax evasion. The 
empirical results in Table VII also show that our findings are robust to (i) controlling for 
endogeneity and simultaneity biases by using instrumental variables (columns (4) to (6)) and (ii) 
controlling for country-year-fixed effects (columns (7) to (9)). 
[Table VII here] 
G. Exploiting Time-series Variation 
  In this section, we exploit time-series variation in credit information depth and branch 
penetration across a sample of 3,800 firms (7,671 firm-year observations) in 42 economies for 
which we have unbalanced firm-level panels. As discussed above, this sample consists of 
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa, with surveys between 
2002 and 2010. This sample includes countries both with and without changes in credit 
information depth, while almost all of them saw changes in their branch penetration over the 
sample period. In the Internet Appendix we present the 15 countries that have seen changes in 
credit information depth, with the years when these changes were undertaken. On average, the 
magnitude of the changes in credit information depth is 1.59 (out of a maximum value of six). 
Most notably are Georgia and Estonia, which went from having no credit registry to having an 
almost full-fledged credit bureau (depth of credit information =5). Similarly, we also find 
evidence that change in financial outreach is associated with firm tax evasion. For instance, 
Kyrgyz Republic’s Demographic Branch Penetration increased from 0.461 to 0.533, and its 
Depth of Credit Information Sharing increased from zero to two between 2002 and 2005 (the 
two years when its two surveys were conducted). During the same period, Kyrgyz Republic’s 
average tax evasion ratio declined from 25% in 2002 to 15% in 2005 and tax evasion incidence 
declined from 58% in 2002 to 43% in 2005.  
As we include firm fixed effects we drop firm characteristics except for the log of the 
number of employees, firm age, and auditing status.  Since panel Tobit estimates with fixed 




The results in Table VIII show a negative relationship between financial sector outreach 
and tax evasion for the sample of countries with a panel data set of firm surveys. We first report 
OLS regressions without fixed effects in columns (1) to (4). We find that both credit information 
depth and branch penetration are negatively and significantly associated with tax evasion. We 
also find that the relationship between credit information depth and tax evasion is stronger for 
firms in small cities, smaller firms, firms in industries that rely more on external finance (column 
(1)), and firms in industries and countries with higher growth opportunities (columns (2) and 
(3)). Finally, we confirm our findings for a smaller sample of 15 countries that experienced 
changes in all country-level variables between the two surveys (column (4)).  
  The results in columns (5) to (8) show the robustness of our results to controlling for 
time-invariant firm characteristics by including firm fixed effects.  We thus estimate the within-
firm effect of changes in credit information sharing and branch penetration on the extent to 
which firms evade taxes as well as the differential effects on firms in different locations, firms of 
different sizes, firms across industries with different needs for external finance (column (5)), and 
firms across industries and countries with different growth perspectives (columns (6) and (7)). 
Overall, our previous findings are confirmed, in terms of both statistical and economic 
significance. We confirm these findings for a smaller set of countries that experienced changes in 
all macroeconomic variables between the two surveys in column (8), though some of the 
variables enter less significantly. Finally, we confirm our findings controlling for endogeneity 
and simultaneity biases by using instrumental variables for credit information depth and its 
interaction with firm and industry characteristics (columns (9) – (12)).   
[Tables VIII and IX here] 
 The results in Table IX confirm our finding that an increase in branch penetration is 
positively associated with a reduction in tax evasion and more so for geographically more remote 
firms, smaller firms, firms in industries with a higher need for external finance and higher 
growth opportunities, and firms in countries with higher growth opportunities. As in Table VIII, 
we first report simple OLS, before including firm fixed effects and instrumental variables.  We 
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find that firms reduce tax evasion as Demographic Branch Penetration increases, and more so if 
they are in smaller cities, have smaller size, are in industries with a higher need for external 
finance (column (1)) or higher growth opportunities (column (2)), and are in countries with 
higher growth possibilities (column (3)). The results are again confirmed when we focus on the 
smaller sample of countries with changes in all country-level variables (column (4)). We confirm 
our findings controlling for firm fixed effects (columns (5) to (8)) and with instrumental 
variables (columns (9) to (12)).  In summary, even when limiting our sample to countries for 
which we can observe changes in tax evasion for the same firm over time and that experienced 
changes in credit information sharing and branch penetration, we confirm our findings, including 
for the differential effects across firms of different sizes, location, financing needs, and growth 
opportunities.  
 
H. Additional Results and Broader Implications 
This section discusses several additional results that support our hypotheses.  To save 
space, these results are presented in the Internet Appendix. 
The results show that firms in countries with more effective credit registries and a higher 
level of branch penetration are less likely to report the severity of collateral as a constraint for 
their operations and growth and are more likely to have audited financial statements. As 
discussed in the introduction, the presence of collateral should be less of a constraint for access 
to finance in economies with better credit information sharing and higher branch density, 
because the information gap between creditors and borrowers is smaller and because creditors 
can monitor firms more effectively. We therefore run ordered Probit regressions using 
categorical responses to the survey question “Is access to finance (e.g., collateral) a problem for 
the operation and growth of your business?” as the dependent variable.37 The results suggest that 
firms in countries with more effective systems of credit information sharing and higher branch 
penetration are less likely to complain about collateral as a constraint for their operations and 
growth. The hypotheses discussed in the introduction also suggest that the benefits of audited 
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financial statements or the costs of “cooking the books” might be higher in countries with more 
effective credit registries and higher branch penetration. We therefore run a Probit model with a 
dummy variable for whether firms have audited financial statements. The results show that firms 
in countries with more effective systems of credit information sharing and higher branch 
penetration are more likely to have audited financial statements.  
Results reported in the Internet Appendix further suggest that tax evasion is negatively 
associated with expected firm growth. While so far we have shown a robust relationship between 
financial sector outreach and tax evasion, it is not clear whether there are performance 
consequences of the firm’s decision. While a rigorous exploration of the link between tax 
evasion and firm performance is beyond the scope of this paper, we provide some tentative 
evidence on the negative consequences of tax evasion for firm performance by relating tax 
evasion to expected sales growth.  However, expected growth data are not available in the 
Enterprise Surveys. These data are only available from a predecessor survey, the World Business 
Environment Survey, undertaken in 1999/2000 across 80 countries. Using data for over 6,000 
firms from this survey, we relate the expected sales growth rate over the next three years to a 
categorical tax evasion variable. 38  We report simple correlations and then add firm 
characteristics, including government and foreign ownership dummies, exporter and government 
subsidy dummies, and the number of competitors, as well as industry fixed effects. Finally, we 
add country fixed effects. Across all three specifications, we find a negative and significant 
relationship between tax evasion and expected sales growth. This relationship is not only 
statistically but also economically significant: an increase in ten percentage points in the tax 
evasion ratio is associated with one percentage point lower expected growth over the following 
three years, where the average expected growth rate is 21.7%.  Therefore, tax evasion not only is 
a corporate decision weighing benefits and costs, but also carries growth costs for the enterprise. 
This result also reaffirms that our findings are unlikely to be driven by a correlation between 
provision of public services by the mafia and financial sector infrastructure, as public services 





 This paper explores the association of credit information sharing and bank branch 
penetration with the incidence and extent of tax evasion across countries and firms. We find 
strong evidence that firms in countries with deeper and more effective systems of credit 
information sharing and higher bank branch penetration tend to hide a smaller share of their sales 
and are less likely to evade taxes. This effect is particularly strong for firms in small cities and 
for firms of smaller size. Furthermore, we find variation in the relationship between financial 
sector outreach and tax evasion across industries with different financing needs and growth 
opportunities. This underscores the importance of firm size, firm location, and industry finance 
characteristics when assessing the impact of financial institutional reforms (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maskimovic (2005)).  The results are robust to IV analysis, to controlling for other 
institutional factors that can explain cross-country variation in tax evasion, and to country fixed 
effects that control for unobserved factors, thus highlighting the importance of financial sector 
policies in addressing widespread tax evasion in many developing countries. Critically, our 
findings are robust to controlling for a standard measure of financial depth, suggesting that 
specific outreach dimensions have a first-order effect on real sector outcomes. Finally, our 
findings are confirmed in a smaller panel sample of surveys where we can exploit within-firm 
variation. We show that the same firms report lower tax evasion after the introduction of or 
improvements in credit information sharing and expansion in bank branch penetration.  Our 
findings suggest a financial system that provides easier access to credit increases opportunity 
costs of tax evasion.  They also show that financial sector outreach is an important policy lever to 
bring more small firms into the formal economy.  
These results are novel in the literature. While previous papers show the explanatory 
power of financial sector development for variation in tax evasion across countries, this paper is 
the first to show the explicit link between two dimensions of financial intermediary development 
and cross-firm and cross-country variation in tax evasion. While previous papers focus on the 
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relationship between governance conflicts within firms and tax avoidance, using data mostly 
from the U.S., this is the first paper to relate cross-country variation in information asymmetries 
and agency problems between financial institutions and borrowers with tax evasion.  
We see this paper as a first exploration of the relationship between financial sector 
outreach and tax evasion. As more data become available, other aspects of financial sector 





Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Original sources 
Firm-level data   
Tax evasion ratio 
Question c241: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you 
estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax 
purposes? The tax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number. 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
 
Tax evasion dummy 
 
Equals one if tax evasion ratio is greater than zero, otherwise zero. 




Question c2071: Where are this establishment and your headquarters located in 
this country?  
(Enumerator, Please code as follows: 1=capital city; 2=other city of over 1 
million population; 3=city of 250,000-1million; 4=city of 50,000-250,000; 
5=town or location with less than 50,000 population). 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Capital city Firm location = 1 (capital city). 
 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Small city Firm location = 4 and 5 (city of 50,000-250,000 and town or location with less 
than 50,000 population) 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Employment Total employment of the firm. World Bank Private Enterprise Survey 
Small firm World Bank Private Enterprise Survey definition: those firms with less than 20 
employees 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Large firm World Bank Private Enterprise Survey definition: those firms with 100 and over 
employees. 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Foreign Proportion of the firm is owned by foreign investors (Question c203b). World Bank Private Enterprise Survey 
Exporter Export dummy equal one if the firm exports, otherwise zero. World Bank Private Enterprise Survey 
Firm age Calculated from Question c201: In what year did your firm begin operations in 
this country? 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Firm auditing Dummy equal one if financial statements of the firm are reviewed by an 
external auditor (Question c232). 
World Bank Private 
Enterprise Survey 
Country-level data   
Demo branch Demographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1,000,000 
adults. 
IMF: fas.imf.org, 
Beck et al. (2007), 
and Kendall et al. 
(2010) 
Geo branch Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km. 
IMF: fas.imf.org, 
Beck et al. (2007), 
and Kendall et al. 
(2010) 
Depth of credit information  
An index that measures the information content of the credit information. A 
value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have 
each of these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, 
loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information (for 
example, late payments, number and amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are 
distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed; (3) 
data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial 
institutions, are distributed; (4) more than two years of historical data are 
distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per 
capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The 
index ranges from zero to six, with higher values indicating the availability of 
more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to 
facilitate lending decisions.  
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 




Information sharing dummy The dummy variable equals one if an information sharing agency (public 
registry or private bureau) operates in the country, zero otherwise.  
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Public credit registry A dummy variable that equals one if a public registry operates in the country during the sample period, zero otherwise.   
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Private bureau A dummy variable that equals one if a private bureau operates in the country during the sample period, zero otherwise.   
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Public credit registry coverage 
An indicator that reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public 
credit registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or 
credit outstanding. The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult 
population. A public credit registry is defined as a database managed by the 
public sector, usually by the central bank or the superintendent of banks, that 
collects information on the creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or 
businesses) in the financial system and makes it available to financial 
institutions. If no public registry operates, the coverage value is zero. 
 
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Private credit bureau coverage 
The private credit bureau coverage indicator reports the number of individuals 
and firms listed by a private credit bureau with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The number is expressed 
as a percentage of the adult population. A private credit bureau is defined as a 
private firm or nonprofit organization that maintains a database on the 
creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system 
and facilitates the exchange of credit information among banks and financial 
institutions. Credit investigative bureaus and credit reporting firms that do not 
directly facilitate information exchange among banks and other financial 
institutions are not considered. If no private bureau operates, the coverage value 
is 0. 
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Total tax rate Total tax rate (proportion of commercial profits). World Development Indicators (WDI) 




Log of time to prepare and pay 
taxes (hours) 
Log of time to prepare and pay taxes (hours). World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Total number of taxes paid (log)  Log of the total number of taxes paid by businesses, including electronic filing. World Development Indicators (WDI) 
   
Private credit / GDP  Ratio of private credit outstanding to GDP. Beck et al. (2010) 
   
Bank concentration (HHI) To control for competition we use a Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the 
squared shares of bank assets to total assets within a given country. BankScope 
Crime Log of per-100,000 population total crime rates. 
United Nations 
Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) 
Rule of law 
An indicator that measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  Higher values mean stronger law and order. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Control of corruption 
 
An indicator that measures the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Higher values indicate 
better control of corruption. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Log GDP per capita (USD) Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita in US dollars. World Development Indicators (WDI) 
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IMF capital account 
liberalization indicator 
Following Bekaert et al. (2005) and Bekaert et al.(2007), we measure capital 
account liberalization by employing the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The indicator takes on a 
value of zero if the country has at least one control in the “restrictions on 
payments for the capital account transaction” category, otherwise its value is 
one. 
 
Bekaert et al. 
(2005), Bekaert et 
al.(2007),  
IMF 
Equity market liberalization 
intensity 
The ratio of the Standard & Poor’s/International Finance Corporation investable 
market capitalization (S&P/IFCI) to global market capitalization (S&P/IFCG). 
The global market capitalization is intended to represent the overall market 
portfolio for each country, whereas the investable market capitalization is 
designed to represent a portfolio of domestic equities that are available to 
foreign investors. Fully liberalized countries for which all of the stocks are 
available to foreign investors have an intensity measure of one, and fully 
segmented countries have an intensity measure of zero (see Bekaert et al. (2005) 
and Bekaert et al.(2007)). 
 
Bekaert et al. 
(2005), Bekaert et 
al.(2007), 
Datastream, 
Standard & Poor’s 
Global Stock Market 
Factbooks 
Creditor rights  
An index that measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy. A score of 
one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders is defined 
in laws and regulations. First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, for 
a debtor to file reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their 
collateral after the reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured creditors 
are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm. Last, 
management does not retain administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from zero to four. Higher 
values indicate stronger creditor rights. 
 
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
Property rights Countries with more secure property rights and legal institutions that were more 




Voice and accountability 
 
An indicator that measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media. Higher values mean greater political 
rights. 




The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. Higher values mean higher quality 
public and civil service. 




The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including political violence and terrorism. Higher values mean more stable 
political environment. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Quality of regulation 
 
An indicator that measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote market 
competition and private sector development. Higher values mean higher quality 
regulation. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial-level data   
EFD (external finance 
dependence) 
 
The fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for both 
public and private U.S. firms in the same industry over 2002 to 2006. It is based 
the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Capital IQ 
GO1 (industrial growth 




GO2 (global growth 
opportunities at the country  
level) 
Following Bekaert et al. (2007), an annual measure constructed as the industry 
composition for each country by output share according to UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics Database. The price-earnings (PE) ratio for each industry at the global 






level is used to construct an implied measure of growth opportunities for each 
country by weighting each global industry PE ratio by its relative share for that 
country. This measure then is subtracted from the overall world market PE ratio 
to remove world discount rate effects (and is also subtracted from a five-year 
moving average). The difference is “growth opportunities” (LGO_MA), that is, 
LGO_MAi,t = LGOi,t - s=1 to 5 LGOi,t-s, where LGOi,t = ln[(IPEt Wi,t)/(IPEt Wt)], 
IPEt is a vector of global industry PE ratios, Wi,t is a vector of country-specific 
industry weights, and Wt is a vector of world industry weights. 
Database 
 
Instrumental variables   
Proportion of other countries in 
the same region that have credit 
registries 
Proportion of other countries in the same region (such as Asia, Europe, etc.) that 
have credit registries. 
Djankov et al. 
(2007), 
World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
Bank supervisor tenure (years) The average tenure of current supervisors. Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2006, 2008) 
log of # of bank supervisors Log of the number of bank supervisors. Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2006, 2008) 
Independence of supervisory 
authority - overall 
The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent of the government 
and legally protected from the banking industry. The indicator is constructed 
based on the following three questions. (1) Are the supervisory bodies 
responsible to a) the Prime Minister, b) the Finance Minister or other senior 
government officials, or c) a legislative body (yes=1)? (2) Can the supervisors 
be sued if they take actions against a bank (No=1)? (3) Does the chair of the 
supervisory agency have a fixed term contract and how long? (=1 if term>=4). 
A higher value means a more independent supervisory agency. 
 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2006, 2008) 
Official supervisory power 
An index aggregating supervisory power. Specifically, it indicates whether the 
supervisory agency has the legal right to meet directly with external auditors to 
discuss their report without getting approval from the bank; receive direct report 
from the external auditor on any presumed involvement of bank management in 
various types of misconduct; take actions against external auditors for 
negligence; change a bank’s internal organizational structure; get access to 
information on off-balance-sheet items; require the bank management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses; suspend the board’s 
decision to distribute dividends, bonuses, and management fees; declare a 
bank’s insolvency; intervene in the ownership rights in a problem bank; 
supersede shareholder rights; and replace management and directors. 
 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2006, 2008) 
Foreign bank ownership 
The fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more 
owned by foreigners. 
 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2006, 2008) 
Private bank ownership The fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more 
owned privately. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2006, 2008) 
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Tax Evasion and Key Macro Variables Across Sample Countries 
This table reports the mean of tax evasion and key macro variables across countries. Variable definitions are 





























1 Albania 0.221 0.685 0 0 0.678 0.572 0.105 391 
2 Algeria 0.254 0.706 0 0 0.481 0.045 0.122 85 
3 Angola 0.584 0.744 1 3 0.530 0.040 0.107 555 
4 Argentina 0.175 0.504 1 6 1.332 0.141 0.130 947 
5 Armenia 0.066 0.298 0.656 1.968 1.125 0.942 0.076 500 
6 Azerbaijan 0.137 0.367 0.639 2.556 0.624 0.463 0.081 493 
7 Bangladesh 0.019 0.058 1 2 0.703 5.205 0.373 1,326 
8 Belarus 0.075 0.267 1 3 0.574 0.231 0.126 547 
9 Benin 0.140 0.406 1 1 0.513 0.128 0.146 155 
10 Bolivia 0.202 0.475 1 6 0.586 0.031 0.378 552 
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.209 0.411 1 5 1.732 1.081 0.381 299 
12 Botswana 0.649 0.688 1 4 0.742 0.017 0.203 551 
13 Brazil 0.327 0.830 1 5 2.034 0.305 0.287 1,502 
14 Bulgaria 0.086 0.274 1 4.651 7.512 4.595 0.472 1,722 
15 Burkina Faso 0.126 0.307 1 1 0.333 0.054 0.176 463 
16 Burundi 0.157 0.415 1 1 0.163 0.280 0.242 270 
17 Cambodia 0.516 0.908 0 0 0.229 0.113 0.072 414 
18 Cape Verde 0.113 0.198 1 3 1.794 1.365 0.449 91 
19 Chile 0.082 0.212 1 5 1.318 0.217 0.807 1,798 
20 China 0.419 0.494 1 2 0.173 0.183 1.189 811 
21 Colombia 0.171 0.363 1 5 1.338 0.367 0.334 920 
22 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.465 0.807 0 0 0.051 0.008 0.046 628 
23 Costa Rica 0.284 0.684 1 5 1.802 1.097 0.356 275 
24 Croatia 0.099 0.392 0 0 2.942 1.963 0.484 372 
25 Czech Republic 0.116 0.477 1 4.576 1.782 1.994 0.343 554 
26 Dominican Republic 0.493 0.736 1 5 0.983 1.264 0.233 182 
27 Ecuador 0.240 0.423 1 4.629 1.389 0.438 0.221 964 
28 Egypt 0.156 0.335 1 3.737 0.420 0.217 0.472 3,000 
29 El Salvador 0.207 0.436 1 5.680 0.732 1.458 0.428 815 
30 Estonia 0.058 0.390 0.453 2.264 1.947 0.523 0.560 318 
31 Ethiopia 0.389 0.624 1 2 0.094 0.040 0.238 484 
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32 Gambia 0.681 0.892 0 0 0.492 0.420 0.156 166 
33 Georgia 0.267 0.588 0 0 0.657 0.355 0.105 357 
34 Germany 0.057 0.449 1 6 2.016 4.090 1.126 1,173 
35 Ghana 0.271 0.557 1 0 0.448 0.272 0.145 494 
36 Greece 0.109 0.527 1 4 3.467 2.558 0.796 478 
37 Guatemala 0.250 0.546 1 5 1.806 1.209 0.271 942 
38 Guyana 0.276 0.764 0 0 0.618 0.015 0.533 144 
39 Honduras 0.234 0.501 1 4.008 1.028 0.391 0.415 720 
40 Hungary 0.109 0.408 1 5 2.059 1.929 0.462 809 
41 India 0.154 0.505 1 2 0.896 2.317 0.394 2,112 
42 Indonesia 0.271 0.444 1 2 1.197 1.000 0.229 707 
43 Ireland 0.038 0.289 1 5 3.457 1.658 1.606 464 
44 Jordan 0.266 0.281 1 2 1.801 0.713 0.883 494 
45 Kazakhstan 0.095 0.292 0 0 0.374 0.016 0.304 763 
46 Kenya 0.199 0.490 1 2.990 0.325 0.119 0.263 875 
47 South Korea 0.099 0.442 1 5 1.741 7.002 0.870 498 
48 Kyrgyz Republic 0.205 0.506 0.444 0.887 0.492 0.089 0.060 435 
49 Lao PDR 0.039 0.154 1 0 0.158 0.025 0.058 279 
50 Latvia 0.099 0.371 0.482 1.445 3.086 0.977 0.497 353 
51 Lebanon 0.347 0.673 1 5 2.955 8.641 0.705 275 
52 Lesotho 0.152 0.393 0 0 0.244 0.099 0.065 28 
53 Liberia 0.320 0.900 1 1 0.291 0.065 0.160 150 
54 Lithuania 0.131 0.435 1 4.312 1.317 0.593 0.270 375 
55 Macedonia, FYR 0.264 0.585 1 3 1.698 1.086 0.209 316 
56 Madagascar 0.115 0.305 1 1 0.136 0.025 0.109 679 
57 Malawi 0.288 0.539 0 0 0.331 0.140 0.079 115 
58 Mali 0.219 0.500 1 1 0.659 0.020 0.183 732 
59 Mauritania 0.470 0.828 1 1 0.399 0.007 0.206 227 
60 Mauritius 0.193 0.286 0.684 2.052 1.981 9.495 0.804 497 
61 Mexico 0.237 0.557 1 6 1.132 0.435 0.197 1,304 
62 Moldova 0.169 0.518 0 0 0.758 0.669 0.210 560 
63 Mongolia 0.368 0.779 1 3 3.992 0.045 0.256 149 
64 Morocco 0.039 0.156 1 1 0.986 0.459 0.426 827 
65 Mozambique 0.547 0.734 1 3 0.236 0.036 0.135 477 
66 Namibia 0.254 0.370 1 5 0.767 0.012 0.485 322 
67 Nicaragua 0.377 0.621 1 4.068 0.595 0.168 0.290 781 
68 Nigeria 0.303 0.690 1 0 0.509 0.470 0.253 1,889 
69 Oman 0.236 0.373 0 0 2.163 0.111 0.369 118 
70 Pakistan 0.132 0.153 1 4 0.791 1.064 0.297 746 
71 Panama 0.371 0.526 1 6 1.863 0.516 0.884 548 
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72 Paraguay 0.192 0.430 1 6 0.402 0.039 0.169 463 
73 Peru 0.127 0.325 1 6 1.231 0.183 0.185 718 
74 Philippines 0.218 0.583 1 3 1.257 2.140 0.331 542 
75 Poland 0.100 0.415 1 4 1.997 2.087 0.284 1,462 
76 Portugal 0.082 0.354 1 4 6.799 6.615 1.412 438 
77 Romania 0.088 0.329 1 4.673 1.650 1.326 0.168 790 
78 Russian Federation 0.172 0.445 0 0 1.687 0.125 0.231 935 
79 Rwanda 0.190 0.325 1 2 0.071 0.158 0.112 209 
80 Saudi Arabia 0.907 0.958 1 5 0.775 0.058 0.369 621 
81 Senegal 0.303 0.427 1 1 0.719 0.144 0.219 691 
82 Serbia 0.233 0.656 1 0 0.565 0.392 0.193 331 
83 Montenegro 0.171 0.425 1 2.365 2.277 0.849 0.242 433 
84 Sierra Leone 0.158 0.773 0 0 0.266 0.121 0.095 150 
85 Slovak Republic 0.081 0.362 1 3 1.988 1.830 0.370 326 
86 Slovenia 0.128 0.471 1 3 2.116 1.801 0.474 395 
87 South Africa 0.149 0.303 1 5.626 0.711 0.187 1.458 1,494 
88 Spain 0.037 0.185 1 5 10.006 7.438 1.457 579 
89 Sri Lanka 0.077 0.432 1 4 0.854 1.998 0.306 324 
90 Swaziland 0.579 0.743 1 5 0.650 0.227 0.213 292 
91 Syria 0.354 0.581 0 0 0.365 0.249 0.196 508 
92 Tajikistan 0.222 0.550 0 0 0.536 0.147 0.163 402 
93 Tanzania 0.409 0.700 0 0 0.118 0.029 0.111 654 
94 Turkey 0.362 0.683 1 5 1.265 0.807 0.204 2,068 
95 Uganda 0.462 0.721 0 0 0.116 0.088 0.101 544 
96 Ukraine 0.122 0.284 0 0 0.379 0.263 0.250 1,051 
97 Uruguay 0.147 0.462 1 6 1.346 0.195 0.237 368 
98 Uzbekistan 0.060 0.207 0 0 3.984 1.617 0.203 523 
99 Vietnam 0.112 0.481 1 3 0.331 0.683 0.659 948 
100 West Bank 
and Gaza 0.129 0.257 1 2 0.838 2.824 0.414 370 
101 Yemen 0.516 0.767 1 2 0.186 0.047 0.074 296 
102 Zambia 0.160 0.536 0 0 0.280 0.021 0.063 151 
 




Table II  
Summary Statistics 
The table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations of the key 
variables. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of countries Observations 
Firm-level variables       
Tax evasion dummy  0.463 0.499 0 1 102 64,438 
Tax evasion ratio  0.213 0.315 0 1 102 64,438 
Small firm dummy 0.478 0.500 0 1 102 64,438 
Big firm dummy 0.208 0.406 0 1 102 64,438 
Small city dummy 0.283 0.451 0 1 102 64,438 
Capital city dummy 0.335 0.472 0 1 102 64,438 
Log employment 3.335 1.545 0.693 10.365 102 64,438 
Foreign 0.101 0.283 0 1 102 64,438 
Exporter 0.203 0.402 0 1 102 64,438 
Log firm age 2.652 0.863 0 5.568 102 64,438 
Firm auditing dummy 0.490 0.500 0 1 102 64,438 
       
Country-level variables       
Information sharing dummy 0.842 0.365 0 1 102  
Depth of credit information 3.129 2.139 0 6 102  
Demo branch 1.363 1.689 0.044 10.006 102  
Geo branch 1.157 1.798 0.006 10.049 102  
Total tax rate 0.489 0.180 0.132 0.967 102  
VAT dummy  0.891 0.312 0 1 102  
Log of time to prepare and pay taxes 
(hours)  5.930 0.681 3.951 7.863 102  
Total number of taxes paid (log) 3.344 0.694 1.946 4.990 102  
Private credit/GDP 0.400 0.338 0.029 1.620 102  
Bank concentration (HHI) 0.238 0.176 0.026 0.950 102  
Control of corruption -0.284 0.703 -1.485 1.862 102  
Rule of law -0.252 0.801 -1.623 1.731 102  
Crime 6.644 1.211 3.642 8.420 102  
Government effectiveness -0.153 0.676 -1.724 1.755 102  
Log GDP per capita (USD) 7.688 1.217 4.812 10.790 102  
IMF capital account liberalization 
indicator 0.083 0.276 0 1 60  
Equity market liberalization intensity 0.423 0.450 0 1 60  
Industrial level variables      
No. of 
industries 
EFD (external finance dependence) 0.254 1.268 -2.297 5.227 102 26 
GO1 (industrial growth opportunities) 2.302 3.292 -7.000 8.904 102 26 
GO2 (global growth opportunities) 0.169 0.382 -0.649 1.946 83 26 
       
Instrumental variables       
Proportion of other countries in the 
same region that have credit 
registries 
0.762 0.118 0.538 1 102  
Bank supervisor tenure (years) 7.326 4.251 1 22.5 92  
Log of # of bank supervisors 4.702 1.267 1.609 8.101 90  
Independence of supervisory 
authority - overall 1.549 0.922 0 3 87  
Official supervisory power 11.214 2.617 4 16 92  
Foreign bank ownership 0.339 0.276 0 1 89  
Private bank ownership 0.423 0.274 0 0.934 89  





Table III  
Basic Results: Information Sharing, Financial Outreach, and Tax Evasion 
For the Probit model in Panel A, the dependent variable is tax evasion dummy. For the Tobit model in Panel B, the 
dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. The pooled sample period is 2002 to 2010. The estimation is based on cross-
sectional data and includes a full set of industry and year dummies. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, 
domestic firms, and non-exporters. The marginal effects (dy/dx) of the regressions are presented. The marginal 
effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the 
dummy variable changes from zero to one. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered for countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Probit regressions  Panel B: Tobit regressions 
Depth of credit information -0.078 -0.072 -0.076  -0.059 -0.059 -0.058 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
Demo branch -0.073 -0.067 -0.064  -0.053 -0.052 -0.051 
 [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]***  [0.004]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm-level controls        
Small city 0.061 0.042 0.038  0.056 0.053 0.052 
 [0.030]** [0.058]* [0.035]**  [0.032]** [0.062]* [0.028]** 
Capital city -0.057 -0.054 -0.051  -0.047 -0.045 -0.041 
 [0.012]** [0.059]* [0.056]*  [0.124] [0.066]* [0.012]** 
Log employment -0.040 -0.039 -0.037  -0.042 -0.041 -0.039 
 [0.017]** [0.019]** [0.025]**  [0.031]** [0.032]** [0.029]** 
Foreign -0.075 -0.066 -0.076  -0.079 -0.086 -0.082 
 [0.023]** [0.113] [0.019]**  [0.114] [0.071]* [0.115] 
Exporter -0.022 -0.025 -0.027  -0.038 -0.042 -0.044 
 [0.154] [0.153] [0.118]  [0.059]* [0.039]** [0.031]** 
Log firm age -0.025 -0.023 -0.022  -0.037 -0.034 -0.031 
 [0.211] [0.213] [0.287]  [0.072]* [0.187] [0.256] 
Firm auditing -0.039 -0.038 -0.033  -0.043 -0.041 -0.036 
 [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.025]**  [0.080]* [0.075]* [0.066]* 
Country-level controls related to tax system        
Total tax rate  0.524 0.443   0.292 0.310 
  [0.015]** [0.017]**   [0.036]** [0.034]** 
VAT dummy   -0.082 -0.062   -0.089 -0.119 
  [0.079]* [0.117]   [0.073]* [0.032]** 
Log of time to prepare and pay taxes (hours)   0.019 0.018   0.030 0.022 
  [0.537] [0.482]   [0.040]** [0.185] 
Total number of taxes paid (log)  0.136 0.151   0.054 0.056 
  [0.041]** [0.038]**   [0.066]* [0.058]* 
Other country-level controls        
Private credit/GDP   -0.161    -0.118 
   [0.057]*    [0.025]** 
Bank concentration (HHI)   0.210    0.252 
   [0.139]    [0.026]** 
Crime   0.024    0.037 
   [0.030]**    [0.204] 
Rule of law   -0.057    -0.121 
   [0.012]**    [0.015]** 
Control of corruption   -0.058    -0.073 
   [0.043]**    [0.052]* 
Government effectiveness   -0.068    -0.152 
   [0.039]**    [0.213] 
Log GDP per capita (USD) -0.014 -0.013 -0.010  -0.032 -0.020 -0.025 
 [0.147] [0.142] [0.160]  [0.041]** [0.076]* [0.124] 
        
        
Observations 64,438 64,438 64,438  64,438 64,438 64,438 
Countries 102 102 102  102 102 102 
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.140 0.145  0.153 0.162 0.179 
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Table IV  
Instrumental Variables Tobit Estimation Second-Stage Regression Results 
This table reports second-stage regression results of the IV Tobit estimation. The dependent variable is tax evasion 
ratio. The endogenous variables are depth of credit information and demographic branch. The instrumental variables 
are the proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries, bank supervisor tenure (years), 
log of # of professional bank supervisors, independence of supervisory authority – overall, official supervisory 
power, foreign bank ownership, private bank ownership, and previous five-year average ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The pooled sample periods are 2002 to 2010 
for Panel A and 2006 to 2010 for Panel B. For Panel B, the sampling weights are the inverse of the probability of 
selection of the firms surveyed. The estimation is based on cross-sectional data and includes a full set of industry 
and year dummies. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-exporters. The marginal 
effects (dy/dx) of the regressions are presented. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete 
change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. P-values 
are computed by heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country and are presented in brackets.  *, **, 
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Without sampling weights  Panel B: With sampling weights 
Depth of credit information -0.091 -0.089 -0.081  -0.109 -0.107 -0.103 
 [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]***  [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** 
Demo branch 
-0.067 -0.063 -0.061  -0.071 -0.069 -0.069 
 [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.007]***  [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.006]*** 
Firm-level controls 
       
Small city 0.063 0.065 0.062  0.061 0.054 0.053 
 [0.036]** [0.037]** [0.040]**  [0.026]** [0.061]* [0.035]** 
Capital city 
-0.052 -0.047 -0.041  -0.046 -0.049 -0.045 
 [0.065]* [0.071]* [0.042]**  [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.022]** 
Log employment 
-0.040 -0.043 -0.042  -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 
 [0.015]** [0.011]** [0.012]**  [0.054]* [0.028]** [0.034]** 
Foreign -0.080 -0.070 -0.076  -0.088 -0.082 -0.074 
 [0.036]** [0.086]* [0.076]*  [0.016]** [0.020]** [0.052]* 
Exporter 
-0.039 -0.044 -0.040  -0.127 -0.129 -0.121 
 [0.125] [0.094]* [0.092]*  [0.051]* [0.056]* [0.045]** 
Log firm age 
-0.045 -0.044 -0.039  -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 
 [0.091]* [0.094]* [0.118]  [0.274] [0.305] [0.276] 
Firm auditing -0.045 -0.046 -0.045  -0.052 -0.058 -0.059 
 [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.014]**  [0.023]** [0.020]** [0.019]** 
Country-level controls related to tax system 
       
Total tax rate 
 0.170 0.212   0.284 0.321 
 
 [0.022]** [0.018]**   [0.017]** [0.019]** 
VAT dummy  
 -0.122 -0.116   -0.098 -0.093 
 
 [0.041]** [0.061]*   [0.081]* [0.154] 
Log of time to prepare and pay taxes (hours)   0.016 0.011   0.008 0.009 
 
 [0.081]* [0.272]   [0.296] [0.279] 
Total number of taxes paid (log)  0.030 0.028   0.020 0.024 
 
 [0.076]* [0.072]*   [0.158] [0.036]** 
Other country-level controls        
Private credit/GDP   -0.086    -0.151 
 
  [0.064]*    [0.039]** 
Bank concentration (HHI)   0.191    0.153 
   [0.167]    [0.218] 
Crime 
  0.031    0.030 
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   [0.067]*    [0.089]* 
Rule of law 
  -0.054    -0.117 
 
  [0.020]**    [0.019]** 
Control of corruption   -0.084    -0.156 
 
  [0.331]    [0.045]** 
Government effectiveness   -0.118    -0.129 
 
  [0.074]*    [0.137] 
Log GDP per capita (USD) -0.010 -0.009 -0.008  -0.027 -0.028 -0.029 
 [0.157] [0.210] [0.205]  [0.016]** [0.018]** [0.017]** 
 
       
Observations 57,094 57,094 57,094  21,541 21,541 21,541 
Countries 83 83 83  34 34 34 
Hansen’s overidentification test (p-value) 0.289 0.319 0.307  0.224 0.229 0.280 






























Table V  
Firm Location and Tax Evasion 
The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) are estimated by Tobit regressions. 
Columns (3) and (4) are estimated by IV Tobit regressions where the endogenous variables are depth of credit 
information and demographic branch, and their interactions with small city and capital city dummies. The 
instrumental variables are the proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries, bank 
supervisor tenure (years), log of # of professional bank supervisors, independence of supervisory authority – overall, 
official supervisory power, foreign bank ownership, private bank ownership, the previous five-year average ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans, and their interactions with small city and capital city dummies (see. Wooldridge 
(2002), p.234). Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The pooled sample period is 2002 to 2010. The 
estimation is based on cross-sectional data and includes a full set of industry dummies. Columns (1) to (4) also 
include the same set of macro controls (country-level controls related to the tax system and other country-level 
controls) as in Table III. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-exporters. The 
marginal effects (dy/dx) of the regressions are presented. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as 
the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. 
P-values are computed by heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in 
brackets.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Tobit  IV Tobit  Country x year fixed-effects 
Depth of credit information -0.060 -0.058  -0.074 -0.076  
  
 
[0.003]*** [0.002]***  [0.000]*** [0.001]***  
  Demo branch -0.061 -0.059  -0.068 -0.063  
  
 
[0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.014]** [0.007]***  
  Small city x Depth of credit information -0.026 -0.022  -0.029 -0.026  -0.020 -0.018 
 
[0.006]*** [0.014]**  [0.007]*** [0.009]***  [0.014]** [0.003]*** 
Capital city x Depth of credit information 0.022 0.019  0.025 0.022  0.015 0.016 
 
[0.027]** [0.039]**  [0.037]** [0.035]**  [0.036]** [0.053]* 
Small city x Demo branch 
 
-0.033   -0.032   -0.026 
 
 
[0.005]***   [0.021]**   [0.026]** 
Capital city x Demo branch 
 
0.012   0.014   0.012 
  
[0.023]**   [0.072]*   [0.032]** 
Small city 0.107 0.113  0.098 0.117  0.087 0.085 
 
[0.022]** [0.024]**  [0.012]** [0.016]**  [0.031]** [0.032]** 
Capital city -0.102 -0.109  -0.087 -0.106  -0.073 -0.092 
 
[0.028]** [0.027]**  [0.063]* [0.058]*  [0.062]* [0.054]* 
Log employment -0.040 -0.035  -0.047 -0.044  -0.033 -0.032 
 
[0.041]** [0.112]  [0.014]** [0.016]**  [0.081]* [0.115] 
Foreign -0.085 -0.074  -0.077 -0.075  -0.086 -0.087 
 
[0.016]** [0.123]  [0.197] [0.217]  [0.011]** [0.012]** 
Exporter -0.025 -0.024  -0.047 -0.045  -0.018 -0.016 
 
[0.143] [0.146]  [0.027]** [0.027]**  [0.108] [0.107] 
Log firm age -0.043 -0.041  -0.039 -0.036  -0.024 -0.020 
 
[0.077]* [0.079]*  [0.202] [0.204]  [0.033]** [0.065]* 
Firm auditing -0.035 -0.036  -0.023 -0.022  -0.017 -0.012 
 
[0.046]** [0.052]*  [0.247] [0.248]  [0.023]** [0.064]* 
        
Macro controls yes yes  yes yes  no no 
Year effects yes yes  yes yes  － － 
Country effects x Year effects no no  no no  yes yes 
Observations 64,438 64,438  57,094 57,094  64,438 64,438 
Countries 102 102  83 83  102 102 
Hansen’s over-identification test (p-value) － －  0.390 0.358  － － 









Table VI  
Firm Size and Tax Evasion 
The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) are estimated by Tobit regressions. 
Columns (3) and (4) are estimated by IV Tobit regressions where the endogenous variables are depth of credit 
information and demographic branch, and their interactions with small firm and big firm dummies. The instrumental 
variables are the proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries, bank supervisor tenure 
(years), log of # of professional bank supervisors, independence of supervisory authority – overall, official 
supervisory power, foreign bank ownership, private bank ownership, the previous five-year average ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans, and their interactions with small firm and big firm dummies (see Wooldridge (2002), 
p.234). Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The pooled sample period is 2002 to 2010. The 
estimation is based on cross-sectional data and includes a full set of industry dummies. Columns (1) to (4) also 
include the same set of macro controls (country-level controls related to the tax system and other country-level 
controls) as in Table III. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-exporters. The 
marginal effects (dy/dx) of the regressions are presented. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as 
the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. 
P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in 
brackets.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Tobit  IV Tobit  Country x year  fixed-effects 
Depth of credit information -0.058 -0.055  -0.075 -0.079  
  
 
[0.000]*** [0.007]***  [0.000]*** [0.005]***  
  Demo branch -0.068 -0.070  -0.071 -0.072  
  
 
[0.000]*** [0.003]***  [0.014]** [0.008]***  
  Small firm x Depth of credit information -0.021 -0.029  -0.022 -0.024  -0.016 -0.018 
 
[0.023]** [0.015]**  [0.020]** [0.023]**  [0.029]** [0.029]** 
Big firm x Depth of credit information 0.027 0.023  0.012 0.013  0.018 0.024 
 
[0.034]** [0.068]*  [0.084]* [0.086]*  [0.069]* [0.035]** 
Small firm x Demo branch 
 
-0.014   -0.011   -0.012 
 
 
[0.026]**   [0.020]**   [0.034]** 
Big firm x Demo branch 
 
0.016   0.019   0.016 
  
[0.018]**   [0.067]*   [0.031]** 
Small city 0.078 0.071  0.063 0.055  0.051 0.049 
 
[0.015]** [0.016]**  [0.027]** [0.030]**  [0.030]** [0.031]** 
Capital city -0.062 -0.051  -0.052 -0.056  -0.038 -0.036 
 
[0.053]* [0.112]  [0.055]* [0.121]  [0.061]* [0.064]* 
Log employment -0.047 -0.048  -0.050 -0.046  -0.047 -0.041 
 
[0.023]** [0.024]**  [0.112] [0.030]**  [0.035]** [0.054]* 
Foreign -0.066 -0.066  -0.080 -0.072  -0.059 -0.058 
 
[0.165] [0.164]  [0.040]** [0.122]  [0.197] [0.195] 
Exporter -0.045 -0.046  -0.038 -0.040  -0.024 -0.023 
 
[0.027]** [0.030]**  [0.127] [0.126]  [0.062]* [0.061]* 
Log firm age -0.042 -0.041  -0.038 -0.039  -0.018 -0.019 
 
[0.269] [0.275]  [0.136] [0.123]  [0.052]* [0.054]* 
Firm auditing -0.036 -0.029  -0.038 -0.039  -0.018 -0.017 
 
[0.039]** [0.054]*  [0.184] [0.171]  [0.011]** [0.014]** 
        
Macro controls yes yes  yes yes  no no 
Year effects yes yes  yes yes  － － 
Country effects x Year effects no no  no no  yes yes 
Observations 64,438 64,438  57,094 57,094  64,438 64,438 
Countries 102 102  83 83  102 102 
Hansen’s overidentification test (p-value) － －  0.353 0.366  － － 
Pseudo R2 0.176 0.180  0.188 0.190  0.331 0.345 
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Table VII  
External Finance Dependence (EFD), Growth Opportunities (GO) and Tax Evasion 
The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. Columns (1), (2), (3), (7), (8), and (9) are estimated by Tobit regressions. Columns (4) to (6) are estimated by IV 
Tobit regressions where the endogenous variables are depth of credit information and demographic branch, and their interactions with EFD, GO1, and GO2. The 
instrumental variables are the proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries, bank supervisor tenure (years), log of # of professional 
bank supervisors, independence of supervisory authority – overall, official supervisory power, foreign bank ownership, private bank ownership, previous five-
year average ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, and their interactions with EFD, GO1, and GO2 for columns (4), (5), and (6), respectively (see 
Wooldridge (2002), p.234). Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The pooled sample period is 2002 to 2010. The estimation is based on cross-
sectional data and includes a full set of industry dummies. Columns (1) to (6) also include the same set of macro controls (country-level controls related to tax 
system and other country-level controls) as in Table III. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-exporters. The marginal effects 
(dy/dx) of the regressions are presented. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent 
variable as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. P-values are computed by heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are 
presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Tobit    IV Tobit   Country x year fixed-effects 
Depth of credit information -0.036 -0.047 -0.049  -0.057 -0.055 -0.064  
   
 
[0.000]*** [0.017]** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.013]** [0.007]***  
   Demo branch -0.055 -0.067 -0.064  -0.076 -0.078 -0.073  
   
 
[0.007]*** [0.002]*** [0.015]**  [0.014]** [0.001]*** [0.003]***  
































































































Small city 0.079 0.084 0.071  0.057 0.076 0.072  0.031 0.028 0.035 
 
[0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.021]**  [0.013]** [0.016]** [0.014]**  [0.057]* [0.054]* [0.029]** 
Capital city -0.056 -0.052 -0.041  -0.042 -0.043 -0.047  -0.038 -0.036 -0.032 
 
[0.053]* [0.130] [0.034]**  [0.018]** [0.032]** [0.068]*  [0.014]** [0.063]* [0.026]** 
Log employment -0.046 -0.045 -0.041  -0.032 -0.036 -0.041  -0.039 -0.038 -0.024 
 
[0.025]** [0.017]** [0.013]**  [0.052]* [0.051]* [0.017]**  [0.018]** [0.021]** [0.064]* 
Foreign -0.065 -0.068 -0.083  -0.077 -0.072 -0.079  -0.057 -0.060 -0.052 
 
[0.178] [0.178] [0.039]**  [0.164] [0.031]** [0.072]*  [0.134] [0.123] [0.203] 
Exporter -0.035 -0.045 -0.043  -0.056 -0.066 -0.037  -0.020 -0.027 -0.018 
 
[0.157] [0.062]* [0.083]*  [0.034]** [0.011]** [0.118]  [0.109] [0.025]** [0.174] 




[0.036]** [0.081]* [0.087]*  [0.215] [0.242] [0.027]**  [0.026]** [0.157] [0.161] 
Firm auditing -0.036 -0.035 -0.045  -0.050 -0.079 -0.055  -0.042 -0.036 -0.039 
 
[0.054]* [0.063]* [0.030]**  [0.020]** [0.147] [0.132]  [0.038]** [0.011]** [0.158] 
            
Macro controls yes yes yes  yes yes yes  no no no 
Year effects yes yes yes  yes yes yes  － － － 
Country effects x Year effects no no no  no no no  yes yes yes 
Observations 64,438 64,438 57,806  57,094 57,094 52,413  64,438 64,438 57,806 
Countries 102 102 83  83 83 71  102 102 83 
Hansen’s overidentification test (p-value) － － －  0.301 0.275 0.204  － － － 




Table VIII  
Panel Data Estimation Results: Depth of Credit Information and Tax Evasion 
The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. Columns (1) to (4) are estimated by OLS without firm fixed effects. Columns (5) to (8) are estimated by OLS with 
firm fixed effects. Columns (9) to (12) are via IV estimations with firm fixed effects, where the endogenous variables include, in addition to demographic branch, 
the depth of credit information and its interactions with small city and capital city dummies, small firm and big firm dummies, EFD, GO1, and GO2. All the 
columns also include the same set of macro controls (country-level controls related to tax system and other country-level controls) as in Table III. The eight basic 
instrumental variables are proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries, bank supervisor tenure (years), log of # of professional bank 
supervisors, independence of supervisory authority, official supervisory power, foreign bank ownership, private bank ownership, and previous five-year average 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Additional IVs are the interaction terms of these eight basic IVs with small city and capital city dummies, and with 
small firm and big firm dummies. Furthermore, extra IVs include the interaction terms of the above eight basic IVs with EFD, GO1, and GO2 for the 
corresponding columns (see Wooldridge (2002), p.234). Columns (4), (8), and (12) are based on a sub-sample of 15 countries for which all macro controls had 
changes during the two surveys of different years. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The estimation also includes year fixed effects and is based 
on firm-level unbalanced panel data over the period 2002 to 2010. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-exporters. P-values are 
computed by heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country and are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 OLS without firm effects  OLS with firm effects  IV with firm effects 
Depth of credit information -0.042 -0.044 -0.035 -0.049  -0.034 -0.037 -0.027 -0.042  -0.044 -0.046 -0.038 -0.037 
 
[0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.014]** [0.006]***  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.012]** [0.017]**  [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.018]** [0.006]*** 
Firm location effects               
Small city x Depth of credit information  -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024  -0.015 -0.018 -0.013 -0.020  -0.024 -0.026 -0.030 -0.021 
 
[0.013]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.000]***  [0.012]** [0.009]*** [0.021]** [0.027]**  [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.023]** [0.019]** 
Capital city x Depth of credit information 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.019  0.009 0.012 0.013 0.026  0.016 0.010 0.021 0.035 
 
[0.062]* [0.067]* [0.068]* [0.055]*  [0.201] [0.043]** [0.062]* [0.059]*  [0.018]** [0.157] [0.039]** [0.030]** 
Firm size effects               
Small firm x Depth of credit information -0.036 -0.041 -0.042 -0.035  -0.026 -0.032 -0.019 -0.014  -0.020 -0.023 -0.036 -0.034 
 
[0.021]** [0.023]** [0.022]** [0.025]**  [0.038]** [0.039]** [0.072]* [0.151]  [0.035]** [0.083]* [0.039]** [0.037]** 
Big firm x Depth of credit information 0.026 0.018 0.017 0.019  0.017 0.018 0.024 0.029  0.022 0.021 0.021 0.035 
 
[0.014]** [0.195] [0.190] [0.159]  [0.192] [0.269] [0.038]** [0.031]**  [0.072]* [0.043]** [0.265] [0.176] 
Financial characteristics               
EFD x Depth of credit information -0.010 
  
  -0.015 
  






  [0.001]*** 
  
  [0.002]*** 
  
 


























GO2 x Depth of credit information 
  
-0.019 -0.029  
  
-0.009 -0.016  
  
-0.014 -0.019 
   
[0.001]*** [0.000]***  
  
[0.007]*** [0.000]***  
  
[0.008]*** [0.000]*** 
Other controls         
Demo branch -0.079 -0.081 -0.085 -0.071  -0.074 -0.073 -0.062 -0.070  -0.098 -0.096 -0.076 -0.086 
 
[0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.014]** [0.006]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.000]*** 
Small city 0.074 0.075 0.073 0.079  
   
  
   
 
 
[0.014]** [0.015]** [0.012]** [0.000]***  
   
  
   
 
Capital city -0.059 -0.060 -0.058 -0.059  
   
  





[0.118] [0.112] [0.124] [0.021]**  
   
  
   
 
Foreign -0.028 -0.016 -0.027 -0.014  
   
  
   
 
 
[0.042]** [0.129] [0.065]* [0.287]  
   
  
   
 
Exporter -0.012 -0.021 -0.019 -0.020  
   
  
   
 
 
[0.117] [0.046]** [0.067]* [0.261]  
   
  
   
 
Log employment -0.065 -0.066 -0.062 -0.065  -0.057 -0.058 -0.058 -0.054  -0.062 -0.062 -0.057 -0.055 
 [0.029]** [0.028]** [0.143] [0.036]**  [0.067]* [0.030]** [0.064]* [0.127]  [0.029]** [0.025]** [0.057]* [0.079]* 
Log firm age -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.015  -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.009  -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -0.009 
 [0.086]* [0.087]* [0.081]* [0.117]  [0.136] [0.176] [0.365] [0.427]  [0.029]** [0.226] [0.109] [0.240] 
Firm auditing -0.061 -0.061 -0.069 -0.059  -0.038 -0.036 -0.039 -0.044  -0.056 -0.055 -0.067 -0.032 
 [0.087]* [0.084]* [0.074]* [0.036]**  [0.215] [0.139] [0.151] [0.206]  [0.043]** [0.083]* [0.109] [0.345] 
               
Macro control yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes  － － － －  － － － － 
Firm fixed effects no no no no  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,671 7,671 6,935 2,620  7,671 7,671 6,935 2,620  7,149 7,149 6,629 2,620 
Countries 42 42 34 15  42 42 34 15  38 38 32 15 
Hansen’s overidentification test 
(p-value) － － － －  － － － －  0.152 0.149 0.232 0.308 






Table IX  
Panel Data Estimation Results: Financial Sector Outreach and Tax Evasion 
The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. Columns (1) to (4) are estimated by OLS without firm fixed effects. Columns (5) to (8) are estimated by OLS with 
firm fixed effects. Columns (9) to (12) are via IV estimations with firm fixed effects, where the endogenous variables include, in addition to depth of credit 
information, the demographic branch, and its interactions with small city and capital city dummies, small firm and big firm dummies, EFD, GO1, and GO2. All 
the columns also include the same set of macro controls (country-level controls related to the tax system and other country-level controls) as in Table III. The 
eight basic instrumental variables are the proportion of other countries in the same region that have credit registries, bank supervisor tenure (years), log of # of 
professional bank supervisors, independence of supervisory authority – overall, official supervisory power, foreign bank ownership, private bank ownership, and 
previous five-year average ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Additional IVs are the interaction terms of these eight basic IVs with small city and 
capital city dummies, and with small firm and big firm dummies. Furthermore, extra IVs include the interaction terms of the above eight basic IVs with EFD, 
GO1, and GO2 for the corresponding columns (see Wooldridge (2002) p.234). Columns (4), (8), and (12) are based on a sub-sample of 15 countries for which all 
macro controls had changes during the two surveys of different years. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The estimation also includes year fixed 
effects and is based on firm-level unbalanced panel data over the period 2002 to 2010. The omitted variables are medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-
exporters. P-values are computed by heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country and are presented in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 OLS without firm effects  OLS with firm effects  IV with firm effects 
Depth of credit information -0.035 -0.031 -0.030 -0.035  -0.021 -0.027 -0.033 -0.034  -0.052 -0.047 -0.031 -0.026 
 
[0.000]*** [0.012]** [0.000]*** [0.006]***  [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.017]**  [0.001]*** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.014]** 
Demo branch -0.072 -0.075 -0.072 -0.080  -0.065 -0.060 -0.061 -0.074  -0.096 -0.073 -0.077 -0.078 
 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.012]** [0.000]***  [0.003]*** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.000]***  [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.012]** [0.014]** 
Firm location effects               
Small city x Demo branch  -0.026 -0.024 -0.025 -0.023  -0.013 -0.015 -0.017 -0.027  -0.046 -0.023 -0.022 -0.034 
 
[0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.017]** [0.000]***  [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]***  [0.015]** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.029]** 
Capital city x Demo branch 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.046  0.012 0.022 0.016 0.024  0.024 0.040 0.039 0.039 
 
[0.023]** [0.021]** [0.024]** [0.015]**  [0.065]* [0.073]* [0.062]* [0.043]**  [0.015]** [0.069]* [0.031]** [0.028]** 
Firm size effects               
Small firm x Demo branch -0.029 -0.028 -0.030 -0.027  -0.013 -0.015 -0.019 -0.024  -0.036 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 
 [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.008]*** [0.007]***  [0.019]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.005]***  [0.020]** [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.023]** 
Big firm x Demo branch 0.030 0.037 0.038 0.031  0.029 0.027 0.026 0.020  0.049 0.035 0.053 0.045 
 
[0.065]* [0.024]** [0.021]** [0.145]  [0.082]* [0.119] [0.159] [0.042]**  [0.026]** [0.122] [0.074]* [0.094]* 
Financial characteristics               
EFD x Demo branch -0.021 
  
  -0.017 
  






  [0.032]** 
  
  [0.028]** 
  
 














GO2 x Demo branch 
  
-0.045 -0.051  
  
-0.018 -0.020  
  
-0.050 -0.034 
   
[0.013]** [0.002]***  
  
[0.014]** [0.000]***  
  
[0.012]** [0.000]*** 
Other controls         
Small city 0.065 0.067 0.069 0.070  
   
  
   
 
 
[0.012]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.014]**  
   
  
   
 
Capital city -0.052 -0.058 -0.053 -0.058  
   
  




 [0.127] [0.034]** [0.138] [0.067]*           
Foreign -0.021 -0.018 -0.029 -0.017  
   
  
   
 
 
[0.076]* [0.115] [0.026]** [0.162]  
   
  
   
 
Exporter -0.014 -0.021 -0.016 -0.019  
   
  
   
 
 
[0.138] [0.033]** [0.145] [0.154]  
   
  
   
 
Log employment -0.040 -0.045 -0.043 -0.038  -0.039 -0.039 -0.041 -0.036  -0.042 -0.039 -0.042 -0.041 
 
[0.059]* [0.013]** [0.015]** [0.217]  [0.016]** [0.042]** [0.056]* [0.125]  [0.012]** [0.057]* [0.017]** [0.076]* 
Log firm age -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.014  -0.019 -0.018 -0.020 -0.015  -0.023 -0.021 -0.023 -0.011 
 
[0.085]* [0.087]* [0.062]* [0.128]  [0.163] [0.217] [0.060]* [0.196]  [0.032]** [0.130] [0.100] [0.369] 
Firm auditing -0.055 -0.054 -0.064 -0.055  -0.042 -0.039 -0.041 -0.033  -0.058 -0.061 -0.071 -0.048 
 [0.075]* [0.074]* [0.060]* [0.031]**  [0.147] [0.151] [0.152] [0.061]*  [0.109] [0.067]* [0.044]** [0.079]* 
               
Macro control yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes  － － － －  － － － － 
Firm fixed effects no no no no  yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,671 7,671 6,935 2,620  7,671 7,671 6,935 2,620  7,149 7,149 6,629 2,620 
Countries 42 42 34 15  42 42 34 15  38 38 32 15 
Hansen’s overidentification 
test (p-value) － － － －  － － － －  0.154 0.150 0.236 0.215 







                                                 
1
 Most of this literature finds a positive relationship between finance and growth, robust to reverse causation 
and omitted variables biases. See, for example, Levine and Zervos (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovi (1998), 
and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000). Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011) have similar findings for the effect of 
financial openness, while Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) find that financial liberalization leads to higher 
economic growth. For a detailed review of the literature, see Levine (2005).  
2
 See Kashyap and Stein (1994) for a survey on a rich literature that relates transmission channels of monetary 
policy to access to finance by firms and banks. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) show that lack of financial 
depth constrains fiscal policy. 
3
 Even in the U.S. the compliance rate is officially estimated at only 86% (IRS (2007)). 
4
 Surowiecki, July 11, 2011, “Doger Mania,” The New Yorker. According to Nikos Lekkas, the head of the 
Greek tax inspectorate, “tax evasion in Greece has reached 12 to 15 per cent of the gross national product. That is 
€40 to €45 billion per year. If we could recover even half of that, Greece would have solved the problem.” (June 8, 
2012, The Telegraph).  
5
 Bhatti et al., 2012, USA Today, January 31  
6
 The reputation losses might also affect the firm’s investors, customers, and suppliers and change the terms of 
trade on which they do business with the firm, thus reducing the present value of the firm’s future cash flows and 
value (Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008)). 
7
 In many countries, tax authorities rank higher than secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover, 
firms engaging in tax evasion often face financial penalties, which would also hurt firms’ profitability. 
8
 In fact, tax information is often collected by credit registries or private bureaus and shared among financial 
institutions (Miller (2003)). 
9
 Better financial development such as credit information sharing mitigates the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard and allows better discrimination between borrowers according to their creditworthiness (e.g., 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Barth et al. (2009)).  While the average cost of capital might 
be lower in markets with better financial sector outreach, the reputation loss might result in a more profound effect 
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due to the better screening and information sharing networks. Thus, overall, the average cost of capital goes down, 
while the variation might go up. 
10
 As Holmstrong and Tirole (1997, p. 665) point out, “Firms with low net worth have to turn to financial 
intermediaries, who can reduce the demand for collateral by monitoring more intensively. Thus, monitoring is a 
partial substitute for collateral.” As can be seen in the Internet Appendix, the presence of collateral is less of a 
constraint for access to finance in economies with better financial development. 
11
 For the relative effect of financial sector depth on the growth of small vsersus large firms, see, for example, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005). 
12
 In this context, our paper also relates to Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2013), who gauge the 
extent to which tax evasion and bribing public officials constitute growth constraints for innovating firms.  
13
 Among others, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) show that tax evasion activities and managerial diversion are 
determined together, and the impact of higher-powered incentives (reduced agency costs) in leading to higher tax 
evasion increases in governance structure. In the same vein, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) show that higher tax 
evasion only leads to higher stock value among U.S. firms in high quality firms. Chen et al. (2010) find that family 
firms are less aggressive in tax evasion than nonfamily firms as they might be more affected by negative price 
reaction from minority shareholders, while Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) argue that tax avoidance allows managerial 
rent extraction and therefore is associated with higher firm-specific stock price crashes. 
14
 Broadly speaking, the paper is also related to the determinants of unofficial economic activities (for example, 
Johnson et al. (1998, 2000), Friedman et al. (2000), Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, and Inchauste (2008)). 
15
 See www.enterpriseseurveys.org for more details. Similar surveys were previously conducted under the 
leadership of the World Bank and other IFIs in Africa (Regional Project on Enterprise Development), the Central 
and Eastern European transition economies (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys) in the 
1990s, and world-wide in 2000 (World Business Environment Survey).  
16
 Among the many studies using firm-level surveys, see, for example, Johnson et al. (2000), Beck, Demirguc-




                                                                                                                                                             
17
 The within-country standard deviation is calculated using the deviations from country averages, whereas 
the between-country standard deviation is calculated from the country averages. 
18
 This indicator is based on expert assessment of how widespread tax evasion is in a country, ranging from 
zero – common – to 10 – not common. Several studies compare firm-level responses related to the business 
environment with data from other sources and find a high correlation (see, for example, Hallward-Driemeyer and 
Aterido (2009)). 
19
 In robustness tests, we confirm our finding with an alternative indicator, Geographic Branch Penetration, 
which is the number of bank branches per 10,000 square kilometer. 
20
 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) and subsequent data collections also present data on the 
number of loan accounts and the average loan balance to income per capita, but these data are available for a much 
smaller set of countries.  
21
 In robustness tests, we gauge the sensitivity of our results to the use of alternative indicators of credit 
information sharing, including (i) a dummy variable indicating the existence of a credit registry, (ii) dummy 
variables for the existence of a public or private credit registry, and (iii) indicators of private or public credit registry 
coverage, measured as the number of firms and individuals listed in registries relative to the adult population. 
22
 Ideally, we would like to have an indicator of actual distance from the economic center of the country, but 
are restricted to using this location indicator as a proxy variable.  
23
 See Berger et al. (2004) for an overview of this literature. Bank concentration might thus influence tax 
evasion through its impact on the opportunity costs of tax evasion.  
24
 In robustness tests, we also include the firm-level survey response to the question about whether taxation is 
an obstacle for the operations and growth of the enterprise, with the responses varying between zero (no obstacle) 
and four (very severe obstacle). Our results are robust to this alternative indicator of tax burden.  
25
 The Internet Appendix may be found in the online version of this article. 
26
 The typical measures for firm size are the firm’s sales revenue or total assets. There is a concern that firm 
size might be endogenous because firm size might be limited by tax evasion levels. Therefore, in this study, we 
measure firm size using the number of employees. Small firms are defined as firms with less than 20 employees, 
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while large firms are defined as firms with more than 100 employees.  We acknowledge that this might only help 
alleviate but not completely eliminate the endogeneity concern. A similar concern might also apply to the firm’s 
location as firms might choose their location for unobserved reasons. 
27
 Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), the U.S. is not included in our sample.  The calculation of industry 
values is based on data from U.S. firms for which financial market frictions are considered to be relatively small and 
should reflect mostly demand.  
28
 Since these industry characteristics are significantly correlated with each other, we do not include them at the 
same time.  
29
 However, cross-sectional Tobit models do not have this kind of problem (see Wooldridge (2002), p. 538). 
30
 The marginal effects and elasticities are computed at the mean of all variables and there might be variation 
across the distribution. We also test the robustness of the results to alternative measures such as the existence of an 
information-sharing agency and geographic bank branch penetration. The results are highly consistent.  
31
 The Sargan test, which requires i.i.d. errors, is not appropriate because the sample weights make sample 
errors not i.i.d. Under this case, the Hansen J test is the appropriate overidentification test (Pitt (2011)). In an early 
work, Manski and Lerman (1977) demonstrate the importance of taking nonrandom sampling into account in the 
estimates and tests. 
32
 In robustness tests, we show that our OLS results also hold in the sample without sampling weights.  
33
 The 21 countries we dropped are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen, 
34
 This question is only available in the surveys of 53 countries.  
35
 As documented in the literature (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999), Caprio, Faccio and McConnell (2013), Durnev 
and Guriev (2012)), government expropriation risks might affect corporate behaviors and outcomes. In countries 
with higher risks of expropriation by the government, firms might have stronger incentives to hide profits from 
government officials. 
36
 These countries are Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, South Korea, 
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Oman, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain. 
37
 Responses vary between zero (none) to four (severe).  
38
 Specifically, we use the responses to the following question: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises 
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical 
firm in your area of activity keeps “off the books”? 1=None at all, 2= 1-10%, 3= 11-20%, 4= 21-30%, 5= 31-40%, 
6= 41-50%, and 7=More than 50%.  
